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“Take back your insurance
Baby nothing’s guaranteed”
—Tom Petty, Bob Dylan, Mike Campbell, “Jammin’ Me” (1987)
I. INTRODUCTION
Perhaps the greatest threat to U.S. national security is the cyber
threat. Vast amounts of wealth are lost annually to this threat—a
wealth transfer historically akin to the conquest of the New World by
Spain. The lack of security in the cyber ecosystem stems from a devil’s
brew of foreign policy, domestic policy, and a substantial, dynamic
threat. In foreign policy, the United States uses cyberattacks to great
effect and leads the world as a source of cybercrime.1 Domestic policy
supports deregulated utilities and encourages private development of
Internet and telecommunications infrastructure for convenience,
1. James Cook, The World’s 10 Biggest Cybercrime Hotspots in 2016, Ranked, BUS.
INSIDER (May 14, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/worlds-10-cybercrime-
hotspots-in-2016-ranked-symantec-2017-5 [https://perma.unl.edu/6UJ8-55XS]
(describing threat numbers including malware, phishing, and spam, which are
sourced from Symantec’s Internet security threat report of April 2017).
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speed, and utility, but not security. The U.S. economy and the breadth
of its industry rely on the Internet and telecommunications infrastruc-
ture. As a market economy, most U.S. critical infrastructure is also
private.2 The United States, therefore, is an attractive target unable
to respond adequately through its national security institutions be-
cause of its own offensive cyber operations.
Domestic cybersecurity measures have failed as well. Public law
responses are fragmented and ineffective.3 The Federal Trade Com-
mission (FTC) has stepped into the void, perhaps beyond its authority,
but it simply cannot address the breadth of security problems that
continue to scale. Private law also fails in the cyber ecosystem, leaving
individuals little recourse when personal information is lost, and busi-
nesses and government little recourse for insecure technology. The
disjointed approach confuses actors and creates inconsistent incen-
tives and uncomfortable decision-making. Basic security measures in-
crease the possibility of government intrusion, and deterrent
measures and research—like bug bounties and friendly hacking—are
criminalized.4
Cyber insurance serves as an adept regulator in this policy vac-
uum, but it faces severe challenges that render it ineffective. The pri-
vate insurance market is undercapitalized compared to large losses.
Cyber risk possesses unique qualities, including interdependent se-
curity and correlated failure. Thus, cyber risk management is difficult,
and the insurance industry is unable to pool risk. Because of these
factors, cyber insurance is not widespread. The insurance is reactive
to regulation and purchased after breaches as an alternative to secur-
ity. It is hard to obtain, expensive, and limited by rigid exclusions.
Coverage that is purchased will not cover many common cyberattacks.
The private market for insurance may be unsustainable.
2. James Eastman, Avoiding Cyber-Pearl Harbor: Evaluating Government Efforts to
Encourage Private Sector Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity Improvements, 18
COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 515, 520, 528–31 (2017). For consideration of “criti-
cal infrastructure,” see Critical Infrastructure Sectors, DEP’T HOMELAND SEC.
(July 11, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/critical-infrastructure-sectors [https://perma
.unl.edu/3PL6-DVE4] (listing 16 sectors of critical infrastructure: chemical, com-
mercial facilities, communications, critical manufacturing, dams, defense indus-
trial base, emergency services, energy, financial services, food and agriculture,
government facilities, healthcare and public health, information technology, nu-
clear, transportation, and water and wastewater).
3. Elizabeth A. Rowe, RATs, TRAPs, and Trade Secrets, 57 B.C. L. REV. 381, 407–08
(2016) (discussing, e.g., how the last federal criminal law effort addressing hack-
ing, the 1986 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (18 U.S.C. § 1030), criminalizes
legitimate security research such as friendly hacking by security firms and aca-
demics and the employment of bug bounties by companies offering rewards for
hackers identifying vulnerabilities).
4. Id.
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After considering U.S. policy, the nature of the threat, the failed
public and private law responses, and the limitations of the private
cyber insurance market, the discussion herein moves to consider a na-
tional cyber insurance program. It considers the need for public and
private collaboration and examines three existing federal insurance
programs. It considers federal backstop insurance, like the Terrorism
Risk Insurance Program (TRIP), as a model to expand the risk pool for
private insurers; the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
as a model to restore faith in shaken institutions; and the National
Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) as a model to address correlated fail-
ure and provide security in future development. Finally, this Com-
ment briefly considers the possible benefits and detriments of a
national cyber insurance program generally.
II. CYBER RISK IS BEST ADDRESSED BY INSURANCE
A. U.S. Policy Contributes to Cyber Insecurity
1. The United States Leads in Cyber Offense
In 1970, the Soviet Union established a new section, Directorate T
within the KGB, tasked with obtaining badly needed technology from
Western research and development.5 Its operating arm known as
“Line X” engaged in cloak and dagger techniques during trips by So-
viet delegations, like applying glue to shoes during a Boeing tour to
obtain metal samples.6 French President Francois Mitterrand in-
formed Ronald Reagan in 1981 that the French had employed the ser-
vices of an engineer working for Directorate T, who supplied
thousands of documents on the Soviet program that included the iden-
tity of hundreds of Line X officers.7 The documents revealed the suc-
cess of Directorate T and that stolen technology was supporting Soviet
defense.8 The trove also included a Soviet technology wish list con-
taining gas pipeline pump, turbine, and valve control software.9
The U.S.S.R’s gas supply was critical to its internal economy and to
its hard currency earnings from the West.10 Accordingly, the United
States engaged in efforts to block Soviet gas sales to Western Eu-
rope.11 The CIA and American industry cooperated in preparing
5. David E. Hoffman, Reagan Approved Plan to Sabotage Soviets, WASH. POST (Feb.
27, 2004), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2004/02/27/reagan-
approved-plan-to-sabotage-soviets/a9184eff-47fd-402e-beb2-63970851e130
[https://perma.unl.edu/8N4D-4WE3].
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
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flawed software and in publishing the technology to Line X.12 The
software was designed to operate properly for a time before resetting
pump speed and valve settings to overstress pipeline joints and
welds.13 The software triggered a huge explosion on a Soviet gas pipe-
line in Siberia in the summer of 1982.14 The explosion was the largest
non-nuclear explosion and fire ever observed from space.15 The Soviet
trust placed in stolen technology was shaken forever, and internal eco-
nomic decline ultimately contributed to the Soviet collapse a few years
later.16 Russia, to this day, maintains that it is entitled to respond to a
cyberattack with nuclear retaliation.17
Similarly, malware targeting industrial control systems caused the
failure of thousands of centrifuges at uranium enrichment plants in
Natanz, Iran in 2010.18 Called “Stuxnet,” the code targeted logic con-
trollers that ran automated processes in the plant and damaged the
operation severely enough to set the plant’s capabilities back two
years.19 Atypical of malware and contrary to common motivations be-
hind malware, Stuxnet targeted a specific, limited set of computers.20
The use of four zero-day hacks in the malware suggests that the target
was of great value to the attacker.21 It was not the work of hackers,
but months of work by organized programmers with significant re-
sources.22 The malware was highly specialized, and its utility in-
tended specifically for the destruction of nuclear centrifuges.23 These
factors and the United States’ refusal to deny responsibility strongly
evidence the involvement of the United States and Israel in the devel-
opment and deployment of Stuxnet.24 It has been suggested that
Stuxnet was designed and used intentionally for compliance with the
Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC).25 Beyond physically damaging the
centrifuges and requiring the replacement of computer systems,
Stuxnet likely inflicted psychological damage similar to that inflicted
on the Soviet Union’s trust of stolen technology.26
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Jeremy Richmond, Evolving Battlefields: Does Stuxnet Demonstrate a Need for
Modifications to the Law of Armed Conflict?, 35 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 842, 846
(2012).
18. Eastman, supra note 2, at 526.
19. Id. at 526–27.
20. Richmond, supra note 17, at 853.
21. Id. at 853–54 (noting the high value of Windows zero-days and that programmers
almost never use more than one in a single piece of malware).
22. Id. at 854–55.
23. Id. at 855.
24. Id. at 845, 853–56.
25. Id. at 894.
26. Id. at 859.
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Stuxnet code spread around the world and now serves as a model
for attacking industrial facilities.27 For example, the Duqu virus,
which appears to collect information from host computers for future
attacks, uses sections of Stuxnet code.28 Other U.S. code developed for
use by the intelligence apparatus have later been used malevolently.
For example, the WannaCry ransomware attack that caused $4 billion
in losses used EternalBlue technology developed by the National Se-
curity Agency (NSA) to exploit vulnerabilities in a Windows plat-
form.29 In addition to the United States’ successful use of cyberattacks
against other countries’ strategic assets and the resulting prolifera-
tion of technology, the United States continues as a world leader in
the source of cybercrime with nearly one-quarter of detected global
threats originating in the United States in 2016.30 This figure, up
from previous years, exceeds the detected threats from China by more
than two-and-one-half times and threats from Russia more than
sevenfold.31
2. U.S. Domestic Policy Fosters Cyber Insecurity
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 set U.S. policy towards the
commercial development of the Internet as one of free market compe-
tition and private development with light touch regulation.32 As a re-
sult, the Internet was not designed for security, but the private sector
contributed $1.5 trillion to build out fixed and mobile networks in the
United States.33
Here is the inconvenient truth about our connected world: the Internet was
designed for accessibility and speed—never for security and protection. While
it has delivered on its promise of social and economic progress, it has also
delivered unparalleled opportunities to those seeking to scale global conflict,
terrorism, criminal activity, state and industrial espionage, and vandalism.34
The same positive quality of interconnection that the Internet pro-
vides also provides ease and the framework for systemic infection,
damaging businesses and economies.35
U.S. policy provides disincentives to security and incentivizes the
use of digital data. For example, the use of Virtual Private Networks
27. Id. at 860–61.
28. Id. at 861–62.
29. Jonathan Berr, “WannaCry” Ransomware Attack Losses Could Reach $4 Billion,
MONEYWATCH (May 16, 2017), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/wannacry-ransom
ware-attacks-wannacry-virus-losses/ [https://perma.unl.edu/TA7A-QSZW].
30. Cook, supra note 1.
31. Id.
32. In the Matter of Restoring Internet Freedom, 33 FCC Rcd. 311, 317 (2018).
33. Statement of Chairman Ajit Pai at 132, In the Matter of Restoring Internet Free-
dom, 33 FCC Rcd. 311 (2018) (No. 17-108).
34. David N. Lawrence et al., It’s the Cyber Crime and Its Sponsors (Not My Cyber-
Security), Stupid, 5 J.L. & CYBER WARFARE 1, 24 (2017).
35. Rowe, supra note 3, at 399–400.
2018] FEDERAL CYBER INSURANCE 561
(VPNs) as a basic security measure to encrypt data and conceal its
location is discouraged by measures such as Rule 41 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure.36 Rule 41(b)(6)(a) extends venue for war-
rants seeking stored electronic media to any district outside the dis-
trict where activities related to a crime may have occurred, if the
location of the information has been concealed through electronic
means.37 It is worth noting, however, that extension of venue applies
to warrants seeking evidence of a crime and property used in a crime.
A warrant, therefore, could seek to search a criminal victim’s com-
puter or an innocent’s computer that is hacked and used for illegal
purposes.38 Once an innocent’s computer is hacked, Rule 41 allows the
issuance of warrant in any federal district to search that computer if a
VPN was used as a basic security measure. If a hacker gets in, so can
the government from a venue far, far way.
U.S. cybersecurity law is inconsistent. U.S. policy encourages and
resulting law requires the transition of information having the highest
privacy interest, such as medical records, to electronic form.39 As a
result, policy demands protection and security of this data.40 The se-
curity stakes of health records becoming inaccessible are the highest
because loss of use could result in patients’ deaths.41 Strict privacy,
security, and breach notification rules, therefore, apply to health
records.42 All states, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and
the Virgin Islands now impose data breach notification laws enforcing
a duty to protect personal information.43 The federal government’s
willingness, however, to respond to security issues has diminished.
Shortly after the adoption of the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
President Clinton recognized the threat to cybersecurity and telecom-
munications stating,
No later than the year 2000, the United States shall have achieved an initial
operating capability and no later than five years from today [May 22, 2003]
the United States shall have achieved and shall maintain the ability to protect
the nation’s critical infrastructures from intentional acts that would signifi-
36. See STEVEN M. BELLOVIN, THINKING SECURITY: STOPPING NEXT YEAR’S HACKERS
92–97 (2016) (providing a discussion of use of VPNs for security purposes).
37. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(6)(a).
38. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(1)–(4).
39. See, e.g., American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, 42 U.S.C.
§ 300jj–11(b) (2012).
40. See, e.g., id. § 300jj-11(b)(1).
41. MARTIN ELING & WERNER SCHNELL, GENEVA ASS’N, TEN KEY QUESTIONS ON CYBER
RISK AND CYBER RISK INSURANCE 24 (Fabian Sommerrock ed., 2016).
42. Paul R. DeMuro, Keeping Internet Pirates at Bay: Ransomware Negotiation in the
Healthcare Industry, 41 NOVA L. REV. 349, 375–82 (2017) (discussing the HIPAA
privacy, security, and breach notice rules).
43. Security Breach Notification Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (Sept. 29,
2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-techno
logy/security-breach-notification-laws.aspx [https://perma.unl.edu/K6TK-DW
RU].
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cantly diminish the abilities of: . . . the private sector to ensure the orderly
functioning of the economy and the delivery of essential telecommunications,
energy, financial and transportation services.44
By 2015, the optimism waned. President Obama stated, “Government
has many capabilities, but it’s not appropriate or even possible for gov-
ernment to secure the computer networks of private businesses.”45
Cybersecurity is national security.46 Private sector vulnerability is
a national security issue because 85% of U.S. critical infrastructure is
private.47 Even a threat just to the payment processing industry is
recognized as a national security issue.48 It is on the forefront for com-
panies, financial institutions, law enforcement, and regulators.49 The
insurance industry recognizes cybersecurity as an issue at the na-
tional and international level.50 Despite this, the policy allocating the
losses sustained due to the lack of cybersecurity remains undecided.51
Recognizing the scope of the security problem, the policy of the U.S.
government changed course from addressing the security problem to
stating that it cannot and should not be responsible to secure private
networks. The U.S. government’s national security infrastructure, un-
fortunately, is the only national institution with the experience and
resources to address the problem.52
B. An Escalating, Dynamic, and Unique Risk
Since 2000, six times more people use the Internet, and they now
number more than three billion.53 Four computer viruses were known
in 1990 and more than 5,000 by 2012, with over 100 new viruses ap-
pearing each month since.54 Between 2009 and 2011 alone, attacks on
44. Public Safety Tech Topic #20 – Cyber Security and Communications, FED. COMM.
COMMISSION, https://www.fcc.gov/help/public-safety-tech-topic-20-cyber-security-
and-communications [https://perma.unl.edu/22KV-DZCV] [hereinafter Public
Safety Tech Topic #20] (quoting Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD-63)).
45. Lawrence J. Trautman, Cybersecurity: What About U.S. Policy?, 2015 U. ILL. J.L.
TECH. & POL’Y 341, 369 (quoting Obama at the Cybersecurity and Consumer Pro-
tection Summit held on February 13, 2015 at Stanford University during which
he promoted, principally, government and private sector cooperation to address
cybersecurity concerns).
46. See Lawrence et al., supra note 34, at 2, 23–30.
47. Eastman, supra note 2, at 520, 528–31; see also Critical Infrastructure Sectors,
supra note 2 (listing examples of critical infrastructure identified by the U.S. De-
partment of Homeland Security).
48. Trautman, supra note 45, at 356.
49. Id.
50. ELING & SCHNELL, supra note 41, at 35.
51. See Lawrence et al., supra note 34, at 43.
52. Trautman, supra note 45, at 358.
53. Jason F. Keen, Conventional Military Force as a Response to Cyber Capabilities:
On Sending Packets and Receiving Missiles, 73 A.F. L. REV. 111, 112 (2015).
54. Id.
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key infrastructure increased seventeenfold.55 Data breaches increased
by 40% between 2014 and 2015.56 Cyberattacks are becoming more
frequent, and prevention is difficult.57 The risk is always changing
with the advent of custom malware tailored towards particular
targets, and security countermeasures require continuous updating
and monitoring.58 Cyber risk is a unique risk because of the speed
with which it changes, and improvements in security can be probed
and adapted too easily.59 The atmosphere has scaled from criminals
seeking small gains to sophisticated and organized groups character-
ized by continuous innovation.60 While bank customers were targeted
in the past, the banks are now the targets.61
The nature of the risk is uniquely broad and can be caused not only
by crime but also by natural disasters, human failure, war, or terror-
ism.62 The risk is characterized by interdependencies.63 The vulnera-
bility of a network depends not only on its own security, but on the
security of other networks connected to it.64 The risk can also be char-
acterized as systemic, involving correlated failure through which mul-
tiple networks fail due to one event, such as when one vulnerability is
exploited on a number of networks.65 Effective computer security is
very difficult and expensive to do correctly.66 It is more complex than
security in the physical world and is reliant on code.67 No system is
ever completely secure, and cybersecurity also depends on how victims
respond to breaches.68
55. Id. at 112–13.
56. Nelly Rosenberg, An Uphill Battle: FTC Regulation of Unreasonable Data Secur-
ity as an Unfair Practice, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 1163, 1170 (2016).
57. Minhquang N. Trang, Compulsory Corporate Cyber-Liability Insurance: Out-
sourcing Data Privacy Regulation to Prevent and Mitigate Data Breaches, 18
MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 389, 389 (2017).
58. See Ariana L. Johnson, Cybersecurity for Financial Institutions: The Integral Role
of Information Sharing in Cyber Attack Mitigation, 20 N.C. BANKING INST. 277,
277–78, 309 (2016).
59. Trang, supra note 57, at 392–93.
60. Jennifer Gordon, Like a Bad Neighbor, Hackers Are There: The Need for Data
Security Legislation and Cyber Insurance in Light of Increasing FTC Enforcement
Actions, 11 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 183, 186 (2016).
61. Johnson, supra note 58, at 277–78.
62. ELING & SCHNELL, supra note 41, at 12.
63. Id.
64. Sasha Romanosky et al., Content Analysis of Cyber Insurance Policies: How Do
Carriers Write Policies and Price Cyber Risk? 6 (Workshop on the Econ. of Info.
Sec., Working Paper No. 28, 2017), http://weis2017.econinfosec.org/wp-content/
uploads/sites/3/2017/06/WEIS_2017_paper_28.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/5RAQ-
56AQ].
65. Id.
66. Justin (Gus) Hurwitz, Cyberensuring Security, 49 CONN. L. REV. 1495, 1501–02,
1504 (2017).
67. Id. at 1502–03.
68. Id. at 1504.
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Hacked government entities include the Israeli Defense Force, In-
dia’s Eastern Naval Command, Royal Bank of Scotland, Defense Re-
search and Development Canada, University of California-Berkeley,
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the U.S. Senate, the Internal
Revenue Service, the Office of Policy and Management, and the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency.69 The 2008 financial crisis forced U.S. state
governments to decrease their security budgets.70 They remain vul-
nerable and have valuable personal information, such as tax, driving,
professional, educational, health, and criminal records, at risk.71
“FBI Director James Comey stated that ‘there are two kinds of big
companies in the United States . . . those who’ve been hacked . . . and
those who don’t know they’ve been hacked.’”72 Hacked companies in-
clude JPMorgan Chase, Amazon, Yahoo, Safeway, Kohl’s, Esurance,
Wendy’s, Aon Hewitt, Comcast, Home Depot, Target, Neiman Marcus,
T-Mobile, Sony, Hilton, Uber, Trump Hotels, Costco, State Farm,
American Airlines, United Airlines, U.S. Steel, and Alcoa.73 At least
97% of Fortune 500 companies have been hacked.74 Any corporation
in the United States can be penetrated, and self-protection through
investment in security can be ineffective.75 For example, JPMorgan
was breached, thus losing account information from 83 million indi-
viduals and businesses, despite a $250 million expenditure to improve
cybersecurity.76 Eighty-seven percent of companies consider cyber lia-
bility as a top ten business risk and consider the risk to information
assets higher than the risk to property, plant, and equipment
(PP&E).77 Seventy-two percent of security experts believe that their
organizations will suffer major breaches within a year, 74% are too
understaffed to address threats, and 67% are undertrained.78 Detec-
tion times are too slow, taking over 150 days on average to detect
breaches and up to another 100 days to mitigate, leaving intruders
eight months to search and sort.79 In excess of 60% of attacks are now
on small businesses, and this trend is increasing.80
69. Id. at 1497; Keen, supra note 53, at 113–14; Trautman, supra note 45, at 359.
70. Trautman, supra note 45, at 359.
71. Id.
72. Trang, supra note 57, at 389.
73. Rosenberg, supra note 56, at 1164, 1170; Rowe, supra note 3, at 403.
74. Gordon, supra note 60, at 186.
75. ELING & SCHNELL, supra note 41, at 31; Trautman, supra note 45, at 346.
76. Eastman, supra note 2, at 518.
77. PONEMON INST., 2017 GLOBAL CYBER RISK TRANSFER COMPARISON REPORT 4, 6
(2017).
78. Lawrence et al., supra note 34, at 27.
79. Id. at 43.
80. Lance Bonner, Cyber Risk: How the 2011 Sony Data Breach and the Need for
Cyber Risk Insurance Policies Should Direct the Federal Response to Rising Data
Breaches, 40 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 257, 274 (2012); Rowe, supra note 3, at
422–23.
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Losses from security breaches are on the rise and not just in the
United States, but worldwide.81 The average annual cost for cyber-
crime exceeds $15 million per U.S. company and is increasing by 20%
a year.82 Damages from breaches to private entities come from diverse
and numerous sources. A breached U.S. company can face damages
from class action lawsuits, FTC actions, Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) enforcement actions, and shareholder derivative
lawsuits.83 It may also suffer reputational damage, contractual dam-
ages, response costs, loss of intellectual property, and share value loss
over 2% per breach.84 Not only is network security interdependent,
but so are the losses caused by breaches. Stock prices may even fall for
Internet-based companies when another Internet-based company is
breached.85
Managing cyber risk is the defining risk management challenge of
this century.86 The Internet generates $2–3 trillion a year and as
much as one-fifth of it is lost to crime.87 One trillion dollars of intellec-
tual property is lost annually.88 The losses represent the largest
transfer of wealth in human history.89
C. State and Multinational Actors Increasingly Involved
The scaling of the attacks and the nature of the attacker are cause
for concern. For example, the Carbanak attacks in 2013 consisted of a
multinational organization of criminals targeting more than 100
banks with a series of sophisticated attacks.90 Losses ranged from
$2.5 million to $10 million per attack and totaled almost $1 billion.91
North Korea had ties to the Guardians of Peace that breached Sony
in late 2014.92 Media reports are rife with reports of attacks from Rus-
sia, China, and North Korea.93 Critical infrastructure is constantly
probed by Russian, Chinese, Iranian, and North Korean hackers, in-
81. Andrew Zachery Ryan Smith, FTC Regulating Cybersecurity Post Wyndham: An
International Common Law Comparison on the Impact of Regulation of Cyber-
security, 45 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 377, 378, 391 (2017).
82. Id. at 378.
83. Trang, supra note 57, at 398–405.
84. ELING & SCHNELL, supra note 41, at 16.
85. Id.
86. Gregory D. Podolak, Insurance for Cyber Risks: A Comprehensive Analysis of the
Evolving Exposure, Today’s Litigation, and Tomorrow’s Challenges, 33 QUIN-
NIPIAC L. REV. 369, 370 (2015).
87. Trautman, supra note 45, at 356.
88. Rowe, supra note 3, at 384.
89. Gordon, supra note 60, at 186.
90. Johnson, supra note 58, at 277.
91. Id.
92. Scott J. Shackelford, The Law of Cyber Peace, 18 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 3 (2017).
93. Kevin R. Doherty, The Art of (Cyber) War, 29 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 16, 17
(2017).
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cluding private sector industry, healthcare, transportation, communi-
cations, and utility infrastructure.94 A variety of foreign attackers
operate for different reasons.95 China and Russia hack for commercial
and political reasons.96 Many actively attacking states do not separate
military and business interests like the United States.97 One Chinese
espionage unit alone breached over 100 U.S. companies.98 In addition
to the usual suspects, France, Taiwan, Japan, India, and Israel have
engaged in cyber espionage against U.S. business interests.99 Iran
and North Korea go further than commercial and political attacks by
employing malware to deny service and to sabotage or destroy.100
Eastern European sources tend to be criminal.101 Other attacks are
more contextual, such as attacks on Western news organizations
originating in Syria during its civil war.102
Over 120 countries have active information operations.103 In terms
of U.S. national security, security experts rate cyber risk from foreign
actors as second only to weapons of mass destruction.104 While there
appears to be consensus that the LOAC applies to cyberattacks, there
is doubt that it can effectively regulate.105 Because of the growing for-
eign risk, the U.S. Department of the Treasury required standalone
cyber insurance policies to comply with the Terrorism Risk Insurance
Act (TRIA) of 2002, effective April 2017.106
D. Unique Cybersecurity Issues Frustrate Policy
Consideration of the various concerned constituencies in cyber-
security issues demonstrates the complexity of policy. They are also
valuable when analyzing policy questions and considering the benefit
and detriment of possible measures. They are used throughout this
Comment to evaluate the effect of shifting responsibilities. Consum-
ers, investors, businesses (including subgroups within having distinct
interests, such as the technology sector), law enforcement, govern-
ment, and national security entities all share interest in cybersecurity
94. Lawrence et al., supra note 34, at 26–27.
95. Trautman, supra note 45, at 356–57.
96. Id. at 356.
97. Id. at 360 (e.g., North Korea, a totalitarian state, attacking Sony rather than a
competing business).
98. Rowe, supra note 3, at 384.
99. See id. at 401.
100. Trautman, supra note 45, at 357.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See Richmond, supra note 17, at 846.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 847.
106. Virginia N. Roddy, Expanding Risks, Growing Market: Cyber Insurance Today,
59 FOR DEF. 80, 84 (2017).
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and each face unique threats.107 Tension arises between these groups
as policy is formed.108 Although this is common for policy considera-
tions in the United States, a unique problem arises in cybersecurity
policy development. “Because cybersecurity involves highly complex
technological issues (and usually hidden costs), many constituencies
will find it difficult to obtain or perceive accurately the information
necessary to determine their own best interest.”109 The inability of
constituencies to perceive their respective interests in cybersecurity
policy is complicated by lack of trust in government and lack of inter-
est by civil groups and academic institutions.110
The policy complexities that arise from the constituencies are nu-
merous. A primary tension arises from businesses seeking liability
protection to information share with respect to security breaches.111
Consumer groups oppose this.112 Government gets caught in the mid-
dle trying to balance these concerns. For example, the SEC requires
disclosure of breaches and perceived cyber risks.113 This government
disclosure requirement, meant to protect investors and potentially
consumers, frustrates law enforcement and national security constitu-
encies’ efforts to monitor and map sources and methods of cyberat-
tack.114 The business constituency opposes the regulation because
breaches continue regardless, so the additional cost of regulation
brings no perceived benefit.115 An independent business constitu-
ency—the cybersecurity industry—benefits from breaches and sees
stock values rise over 1%, or the equivalent of over $1 billion, after the
announcement of another company’s breach.116
Another conflict between constituencies previously discussed is the
use of offensive cyberattack to affect what national security entities
may view as higher priority security interests—such as limiting the
proliferation of nuclear weapons—only to have the code later used
against U.S. interests, such as with Stuxnet and EternalBlue. Rules
that seek to regulate specific industries or protect consumers do little
to address the general issues that make cybersecurity difficult, result-
ing in inefficiency.117 A cohesive policy on cybersecurity would need to
overcome fundamental geopolitical questions and contentious parti-
107. See Trautman, supra note 45, at 351.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Johnson, supra note 58, at 298.
112. See id. at 300.
113. Trautman, supra note 45, at 354.
114. Id. at 354–55.
115. See id. at 357.
116. ELING & SCHNELL, supra note 41, at 16 n.7.
117. Hurwitz, supra note 66, at 1517.
568 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97:555
san differences; however, consistent terminology to even discuss these
issues has yet to evolve.118
One primary barrier to policy and regulation is the attribution
problem, the identity of the bad actor in cybersecurity is difficult to
ascertain.119 “Due to the technological nature of data breaches, it is
difficult to ascertain the wrongdoer, the severity of damages, and even
the fact that identity theft occurred.”120 Stolen information is intangi-
ble. When it is copied, the original may remain intact and in place,
unlike tangible items.121 This results in the lengthy delay in detection
discussed above, which again reduces the likelihood of identifying the
perpetrator.122 The source of the attack that breached Target in 2013,
causing losses into the hundreds of millions, has not been identi-
fied.123 A Russian teen may have created the malware, but it was then
placed on the Internet for anyone to use.124 The same is true of the
2011 Sony PlayStation Network breach.125 A breach may involve
criminals in several countries, raising jurisdictional issues should a
source be identified.126 The same attribution problem arises in deter-
mining if a state actor was involved, even if the individual source is
determined.127 The inability to identify online actors serves as a bar-
rier to effective regulation.128 The problem is not simply that attack-
ers cannot be identified, but is often that they are misidentified.129
Observers have joked that government officials are often wrong as to
the source, scope, and intent of an attack, but never in doubt.130 The
attribution problem means that losses from cyber breaches cannot be
transferred to the responsible party. The various constituencies,
therefore, are left to struggle with allocating losses.
One business constituency that could be held responsible is the
technology sector that produces products containing vulnerabilities—
the very vulnerabilities that can affect many entities and result in cor-
related failure discussed above.131 Cybersecurity is completely depen-
dent on code.132 The heart of all cybersecurity is software, regardless
118. See Trautman, supra note 45, at 376–78.
119. Hurwitz, supra note 66, at 1513–14.
120. Daniel Bugni, Standing Together: An Analysis of the Injury Requirement in Data
Breach Class Actions, 52 GONZ. L. REV. 59, 61 (2017).
121. Rowe, supra note 3, at 393.
122. Id.
123. Eastman, supra note 2, at 517.
124. Id. at 517–18.
125. Bonner, supra note 80, at 259–60.
126. See Johnson, supra note 58, at 277.
127. Doherty, supra note 93, at 16–17.
128. Trautman, supra note 45, at 377.
129. See BELLOVIN, supra note 36, at 40.
130. Id.
131. See Romanosky et al., supra note 64, at 6, for a discussion of correlated failure.
132. Hurwitz, supra note 66, at 1501–05.
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of the complexity of the systems or the size of the entity seeking pro-
tection.133 Code is law, and whoever controls the software makes the
rules.134 Contracts that are routinely upheld by courts immunize the
technology sector from their business constituent clients.135 End-user
license agreements (EULAs) are used by developers to pass the cost
down the line to the purchasing business.136 Without any legal re-
gime, insurance, or other mechanism to shift this risk, the risk falls to
consumers—or the owners of the information lost—and they are com-
pletely reliant on the entity or business to protect the information.137
They also lack any recourse against the technology sector because a
strict liability regime is not in place, and legal requirements of privity
stand in the way.138 Without regulation, businesses may have little
incentive to protect consumer information.139 Businesses, further-
more, are preoccupied with other matters and fail to appreciate the
current and future costs of security breaches.140 Without liability pro-
tection, businesses are hesitant to share information that could con-
tribute to better security.141 If a breach occurs, breach notification
statutes do not require the disclosure or information sharing of the
vulnerability that led to the breach, again passing the cost and re-
sponsibility away from the developers to businesses and ultimately to
consumers.142
Allocating responsibility in the case of a state actor is a more diffi-
cult task still. Little recourse exists in private international law, and
exploration of the possibilities of using private international law to
enhance cybersecurity are barely explored.143 The likelihood of an
armed response under the existing international regime is unlikely:
These opinions on the future of use of force concepts aside, the combination of
law and politics makes it clear that in any likely scenario an authorization by
the UN Security Council to use force against a cyber-only capability is dubious
at best. There is also little chance that the ICJ would ever make a finding that
a cyber intrusion was an “armed attack” based on its excessively-high thresh-
olds for the “use of force” and “armed attack” as coupled with the unwilling-
133. Marian K. Riedy & Bartlomiej Hanus, It Is Just Unfair Using Trade Laws to
“Out” Security Software Vulnerabilities, 48 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1099, 1114–15
(2016).
134. Trautman, supra note 45, at 349 (“In cyberspace, as Lawrence Lessig says, ‘[c]ode
is law.’ James Grimmelman observes that ‘[u]nlike the rule of law, the rule of
software is simple and brutal; whoever controls the software makes the
rules. . . .’ ”).
135. See Hurwitz, supra note 66, at 1515.
136. Riedy & Hanus, supra note 133, at 1109.
137. Rosenberg, supra note 56, at 1164.
138. Hurwitz, supra note 66, at 1524.
139. Id. at 1511.
140. Trautman, supra note 45, at 358.
141. Johnson, supra note 58, at 285, 297–98.
142. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82 (West 2018).
143. Shackelford, supra note 92, at 3–4.
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ness to attribute any hostile action to a State which does not openly declare
ownership of said action.144
Although the LOAC may apply to cyberattacks by international
consensus, the primary consideration under the existing regime is
whether a cyberattack comports with the LOAC.145 In other words,
the LOAC does not serve as a bar to cyberattacks, and governments
are generally opposed to new treaties regarding cyberattacks.146 The
sources of the LOAC are worth consideration in the context of cyberat-
tacks. Beyond treaties, custom forms the basis of the LOAC and, as set
forth above, the United States has both perpetrated cyberattacks and
has not responded to attacks with force as a matter of custom.147 Con-
templation of the use of force to respond to cyberattacks is largely hy-
pothetical because rarely do cyber operations “cross the armed attack
threshold.”148 Instead, “[t]he majority of the cyber risk facing the pub-
lic and private sectors lies in the arena of cybercrime and espio-
nage.”149 Consider, for example, events of February 2013 when a
government report detailed the activities of one unit of hackers of the
Chinese People’s Liberation Army, which was clearly condoned by the
Chinese government.150 The United States response was outlined as
follows:
First, we will increase our diplomatic engagement . . . [and] convey our con-
cerns to countries where there are high incidents of trade secret
theft . . . . Second, we will support industry-led efforts to develop best practices
to protect trade secrets . . . . Third, [the Department of Justice] will continue
to make the investigation and prosecution of trade secret theft by foreign com-
petitors and foreign governments a top priority . . . . Fourth, . . . we will con-
duct a review of our laws to determine if further changes are needed to
enhance enforcement . . . . Lastly, we will increase public awareness of the
threats and risks to the U.S. economy posed by trade secret theft.151
This soft response to theft clearly attributable to an armed force of
another nation contains no mention of the national security apparatus
and provides the stark reality facing U.S. businesses, institutions, and
consumers. The only institution capable of responding to this risk is
the national security apparatus, but the consequence of U.S. conduct
is that it cannot respond.
144. Keen, supra note 53, at 149.
145. Richmond, supra note 17, at 864.
146. Id. at 865.
147. Id. at 869–71.
148. Shackelford, supra note 92, at 4.
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150. Rowe, supra note 3, at 384–85.
151. Id. at 385 (quoting Victoria Espinel, Launch of the Administration’s Strategy to
Mitigate the Theft of U.S. Trade Secrets, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Feb. 20, 2013, 2:59
PM), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2013/02/20/launch-administra
tion-s-strategy-mitigate-theft-us-trade-secrets [https://perma.unl.edu/28WK-
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The purpose of this discussion is not to question the wisdom of the
policy decisions to use cyberattack as either an offensive or preemp-
tive national security measure. Nor is it to question the policy of tele-
communications deregulation to foster private sector economic and
infrastructure development. The purpose is to draw attention to the
overwhelming risk these policies create, how they limit the U.S. gov-
ernment’s ability to provide security, and to begin a discussion of
cyber risk management.
III. RESPONSES TO CYBER RISK BEYOND INSURANCE
ARE FAILING
“Public law” refers to a general classification of law concerning the
relationship between the state and the people who compose it and the
responsibilities of public officers.152 This section focuses on criminal,
administrative, and legislative responses to cyber risk. It is distinct
from “private law,” discussed in the next section, which concerns the
relationships between individuals, corporations, and associations or,
more simply put, between citizen and citizen.153
A. The Public Law Response Is Inadequate
In general terms, the United States was unprepared for the explo-
sion of cyber risk, and there is a misperception that cybersecurity is a
new problem. The reason for this unpreparedness is not entirely clear.
Government recognition of the importance of computer security dates
back to 1965; the Brooks Act created what is now called the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), which is responsible
for promulgating computer security standards.154 Computer viruses
date to the 1990s.155 By the late 1990s, business losses to security
breaches ranged into the hundreds of billions.156 Cyber insurance pol-
icies began to appear by the late 1990s.157 The Love Bug virus circu-
lated in 2000, causing $15 billion in damage around the world.158 The
Y2k bug, or concern with computers’ internal clocks not correctly rec-
ognizing two digit year dates for 2000 (‘00) as coming after 1999 (‘99),
cost U.S. government and businesses as much as $225 billion.159 It
152. See Public Law, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
153. See Private Law, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
154. Public Safety Tech Topic #20, supra note 44.
155. Keen, supra note 53, at 112.
156. Bonner, supra note 80, at 262.
157. DANIELLE GILMORE & DAVID ARMILLEI, The Future Is Now: The First Wave of
Cyber Insurance Litigation Commences, and the Groundwork Is Laid for the Com-
ing Storm, in INSURANCE LAW 2016: TOP LAWYERS ON TRENDS AND KEY STRATE-
GIES FOR THE UPCOMING YEAR 23 (2016) (available at 2016 WL 1089828).
158. Bonner, supra note 80, at 262.
159. DeWayne Lehman, Senate: Y2k Fixes Worth the Billions Spent, COMPUTERWORLD
(Mar. 6, 2000), https://www.computerworld.com/article/2593290/it-management/
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also led to significant education regarding cybersecurity: “ ‘Most signif-
icantly, the IT infrastructure and mechanisms for more effectively
managing it have been modernized,’ . . . . ‘Also, Y2k has caused a
heightened level of knowledge among executive-level managers as to
the importance and vulnerabilities of information technology.’”160
Public law authorities were not so educated, and the United States
suffered from and continues to suffer from its gerontocratic tendencies
with respect to cybersecurity. Around the time of Love Bug, the FBI
Director did not have a computer in his office, and the Secretary of
Defense needed staff to print out his e-mails for him.161 The person
responsible for protecting the United States from cyber threats, the
Director of Homeland Security, commented publicly that he did not
use e-mail as late as 2012.162 As of 2013, eight out of nine U.S. Su-
preme Court justices—responsible for determining cyber legality—did
not use e-mail.163 Prominent Senators such as Lindsey Graham, Orrin
Hatch, and Chuck Schumer do not use e-mail.164 Many business and
government leaders continue to be over the age of fifty.165 As a result
of leadership being, as former CIA Director General Michael Hayden
coined them, “digital immigrants,” no substantive cybersecurity legis-
lation was passed during the big bang of cyber risk between 2002 and
2014.166 The last effort in criminal law at the federal level pertaining
to cybersecurity was the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA)
adopted in 1986.167 The measures in place have unintended conse-
quences. For example, employing hackers to retaliate against attack-
ers has been suggested as a potential deterrent in the realm of
protecting trade secrets, but this conduct is criminalized by the
CFAA.168 The same is true of legitimate security research activity.169
Initiatives to address cyber risk at the federal level are fragmented
at best. Over 100 cybersecurity bills were introduced in the last sev-
eral years, but most were unsuccessful.170 Congress is generally reluc-
tant to act.171 The competing interests between business and
consumer constituencies vexes the executive and legislative branches
senate—y2k-fixes-worth-the-billions-spent.html [https://perma.unl.edu/FL9H-
6SPP].
160. Id. (quoting from the final report of the U.S. Senate Special Committee on the
Year 2000 Technology Problem).
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of government.172 Lobbying opposes meaningful regulation, and po-
tential regulation is feared too complex and too expensive.173 No com-
prehensive data security legislation has passed.174 What is in place is
a disconnected patchwork of federal and state laws.175 For example,
NIST maintains a list of known software vulnerabilities but not of
malware and security breaches.176 Current public law has three glar-
ing deficiencies: it is overly voluntary, it is overly reactive, and it lacks
involvement of the national security infrastructure.177 These deficien-
cies have rendered the public law structure largely ineffective.178
Consider, for example, the Cybersecurity Act of 2015.179 In short,
the Act encourages information sharing with the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), requires consumer personal information be
removed from the information shared, and offers limited liability for
sharing information.180 The assumption is that if enough vulnerabili-
ties are shared, blanket defenses can be derived against the finite
number of threats.181 This assumption is flawed because continuously
probing, custom malware produces infinite possibilities for breach as
hundreds of millions of new malware viruses generate each year.182
Furthermore, the delay in detection means that information sharing
comes too late to be effective.183 As of late 2016, only one company had
shared data with DHS under the Act.184 Overall, the Act has been
called too little, too late, like “driving a car by looking in the rearview
mirror.”185 Arguably more effective measures, such as mandatory in-
surance and requiring basic measures (e.g., patching and updating),
are absent in public law.186
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One notable exception to federal inaction is the FTC.187 Critics
have noted that the FTC stepping into this void may exceed jurisdic-
tional limits because of the absence of congressional authorization.188
The FTC brings enforcement actions under a standard of failure to
provide reasonable and appropriate data security for personal infor-
mation.189 It has, however, created confusion because it has not pro-
duced a Trade Regulation Rule (TRR) or any other meaningful
guidance or standards for the meaning of reasonable and appropriate
security.190
What many companies in the private sector may find troubling is that, al-
though the . . . cost-benefit balancing test pushes them to evaluate their prac-
tices, the FTC has not published clear standards for what exactly constitutes
unreasonable cybersecurity and data security measures. This places the FTC
in an odd position where it can prosecute businesses for not maintaining rea-
sonable data security practices without telling businesses what exactly they
consider reasonable practices.191
Although it has been successful and brought fifty cases between 2002
and 2014, it is now facing growing resistance and litigation.192 The
enforcement actions are costly and case-by-case enforcement is ineffi-
cient.193 The FTC will not be able to keep up with the increasing num-
bers of data breaches.194 The FTC’s enforcement actions are
consumer-based, fail to address larger security concerns, and fail to
educate about cybersecurity issues.195
Of primary concern for the subject matter herein is that public law
contains no remedy for losses caused by failed cybersecurity. “[T]here
are no public law institutions that generally ensure parties harmed by
adverse cyber-incidents can secure recovery for their losses, that alter
the perverse incentives faced by the various actors in the cyber-
security ecosystem, or that generally improve the overall quality of
that ecosystem.”196 Reliance on the government in the United States
is misplaced.197 More concerning still is that the patchwork, ineffec-
tive body of public law in the United States is the world’s most ad-
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188. GILMORE & ARMILLEI, supra note 157, at *10–13.
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2018] FEDERAL CYBER INSURANCE 575
vanced in its efforts to integrate cybersecurity into politics and
business.198
B. Private Law Is Ineffective at Addressing Cyber Losses
Actions by consumers to redress cyber losses in private law face
many challenges. Cases need to survive standing challenges, both
facially and factually.199 Because of the standing requirement of ac-
tual harm, losing data is insufficient and concrete damage, such as
fraudulent charges, need to be demonstrated for successful litiga-
tion.200 For this reason, plaintiffs have had marginal success in
courts.201 That is, if a consumer can even get to court. Private law
remedies are limited by the attribution problem, and finding the re-
sponsible party in a technologically complex environment is a difficult
hurdle to overcome.202 The failure of plaintiffs to track insurance poli-
cies in their allegations may also risk the loss of insurance
coverage.203
Furthermore, in actions by business constituents, EULAs prevent
private law remedies by breached entities against developers of secur-
ity software:
On the face of these license agreements, the commercial user—the company
that purchases the security software—bears the risk of loss in the event of a
data breach. This contractual allocation of risk may be a perfectly reasonable
choice for the licensee, for it can insure against that risk. But to the extent the
lack of accountability on the part of security software vendors undermines the
goal of data security, this scenario should be unacceptable to the millions of
consumers whose sensitive personal information, housed by the purchasers of
commercial security systems, is consequently more vulnerable to theft and
misuse.204
Third, private law has left cyber insurance coverage in a state of
chaos. Many insurance terms that could cover cyber loss either in
standalone policies or in traditional liability policies remain untested
in litigation.205 Courts have avoided interpreting cyber insurance is-
sues along traditional insurance lines, such as with consideration of
intentional acts under liability policies.206 The lack of judicial infor-
mation has led to coverage unforeseen by insurers, preventing them
from limiting the effect of correlated failure.207 The reverse is also
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true, with unforeseen gaps in coverage rendering policies illusory once
considered by a court.208 Overall, uncertainty has left insurers to re-
duce their exposure and limits.209
C. Public and Private Law Contradict Limiting Remedies
In Zurich American Insurance Co. v. Sony Corp. of America, a court
held that Sony did not have coverage under policy language regarding
publication of personal information after a data breach.210 The rea-
soning was that the theft of data was not a publication by Sony and
was, therefore, not covered.211 At the same time, the FTC could bring
an action for Sony’s failure to make reasonable efforts at data protec-
tion. In other words, there is no coverage for actions of third parties in
private law, but there is responsibility for third party acts in public
law.212 This can leave a business constituent in a terribly vulnerable
position—being liable in regulatory enforcement without coverage.213
Furthermore, courts uphold policy exclusions for statutory viola-
tions.214 When the effect of this is considered under the myriad of data
protection duties found in state and federal law, the effect is chilling.
For example, personal information was released by a video company,
and coverage was avoided because the company violated a Michigan
video rental privacy statute.215 Private law rulings like this leave lit-
tle comfort for consumers, business constituents, or insurers. The
overall security environment is affected because businesses are dis-
suaded from information sharing for fear of public law prosecution or
private law results leaving them uninsured.216
IV. THE PRIVATE INSURANCE MARKET IS UNABLE TO
MANAGE CYBER RISK
A. The Market Is Undercapitalized
1. Current Market Capitalization
Empirical research indicates that the cyber insurance industry has
the potential to serve as a highly effective regulator and an engine of
risk management, even when compared to other forms of insur-
208. Erica J. Dominitz, To Err Is Human; To Insure, Divine: Shouldn’t Cyber Insur-
ance Cover Data Breach Losses Arising (in Whole or in Part) from Negligence?,
BRIEF, Summer 2017, at 32, 35–36.
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ance.217 This evidence suggests that cyber insurance providers should
strengthen organizational compliance and improve their response to
data breaches.218 The current cyber insurance market has reached $2
billion in annual premiums.219 Boosted by SEC cyber risk disclosure
requirements, the cyber insurance market may be worth at least $7.5
billion by 2020.220 Higher estimates place the market at $20 billion by
the end of the decade.221 By way of comparison, the commercial insur-
ance market in terms of net premiums was $247 billion in 2015.222
The total value of insurance premiums written in the United States
approaches $2 trillion annually.223 The cybersecurity industry will
greatly exceed the insurance market, ballooning to $170 billion by
2020.224
Development of the cyber insurance market is hampered by insur-
ability issues related to low limits, policy variation, and hidden or in-
direct losses.225 For example, Target, subject to a highly damaging
breach in 2013, could not find adequate insurance.226 “The Target
breach demonstrates that demand is no longer the problem in insur-
ing companies against cyber risk—it is now an issue of quality of sup-
ply.”227 The numbers referred to in this section for capitalization of
the insurance market refer to premiums written, not coverage limits.
The total amount of coverage is difficult to calculate.228 Estimates
place the premium to coverage ratio at about 1% with a $100,000 pre-
mium buying a policy limit of $10 million.229 Rough estimates, there-
fore, place existing coverage in the United States at $200 billion.
217. Shauhin A. Talesh, Insurance Companies as Corporate Regulators: The Good, the
Bad, and the Ugly, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 463, 474–84 (2017) (comparing cyber insur-
ance regulation of corporate entities with director and officer policies and employ-
ment and anti-discrimination (EPLI) coverage).
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2. Losses Outstrip the Market
As discussed above, the overall cyber loss exceeds $1 trillion per
year.230 Because of correlated failure and inherent interdependencies,
cyber events have the potential to inflict natural-disaster-type dam-
ages in a single incident.231 WannaCry ransomware damages in 2017
may total $4 billion.232 In 2016, other ransomware attacks caused
losses of $1.5 billion.233 The Love Bug caused upwards of $15 billion in
damage two decades ago.234 More significantly, the cost per attack
and per breach has risen. One attack cost Target $148 million.235 One
settlement of a class action lawsuit resulting from a breach cost An-
them $115 million.236 One criminal gang alone caused banks to lose
$1 billion.237 The average cost per data breach is also increasing be-
cause of the recent trend towards litigation by consumers, with the
current average breach costing $5.58 million.238
The losses are so high that they now represent existential risk to
breached companies.239 In the case of insurers, the issues of interde-
pendency and correlated failure discussed above can serve to magnify
damages into ranges that would be existential threats to many na-
tions. Insurers fear a “Cybergeddon” event, and the probability of a
critical information infrastructure breakdown in the next decade is
10%.240 Such an event leading to the loss of e-mail, text messaging,
cloud service, and online banking could cause $250 billion in losses in
a few days alone.241 Blackouts further concern insurers. The cascad-
ing effects of the loss of a power grid serving just fifteen U.S. states
could cause damages of up to $1 trillion and insurance claims totaling
over $70 billion.242 These numbers represent the short term only. The
estimated cost of a blackout in the United Kingdom in the short term
is £49 billion, but with losses of £442 billion in the five years following
the blackout.243 Events like these, perhaps caused by a natural disas-
ter instead of malicious conduct, could place additional pressure on
insurers facing both cyber risk and property claims from a single
event. The market is not large enough, with approximately $200 bil-
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232. Berr, supra note 29.
233. Id.
234. Bonner, supra note 80, at 262.
235. Eastman, supra note 2, at 517.
236. Meghan E. Ruesch, Show Me the Bitcoin! The Costs of Cyber Risks and the Cyber-
Insurance Coverage Landscape, IN-HOUSE DEF. Q., Fall 2017, at 66.
237. Johnson, supra note 58, at 277.
238. Gordon, supra note 60, at 184–85.
239. Talesh, supra note 217, at 474.
240. ELING & SCHNELL, supra note 41, at 28, 31.
241. Id. at 28.
242. Id.
243. Id.
2018] FEDERAL CYBER INSURANCE 579
lion in coverage addressing $1 trillion in annual losses, and the poten-
tial loss is so extreme that the ability of the market to ever address the
risk is questionable.
B. Cyber Risk Management Is Uniquely Difficult
1. From the Consumer and Business Perspective
Traditional risk management balances prevention and insurance,
with the extent of preventative measures depending on the pricing of
insurance:
[R]isk management is often framed as a trade-off between investing in con-
trols that reduce the average loss of a security event, and insuring against a
loss. Indeed, [sources] show that as insurance becomes more affordable, there
is less incentive to invest in self-protection (IT security) measures. At an ex-
treme, if the price of insurance were very inexpensive, companies would be
very unlikely to protect themselves against any kind of loss. Conversely, as
insurance becomes more expensive, companies become more willing to self-
protect (the price of insurance becomes much higher relative to any security
measures). [Sources] also suggest that the demand for insurance is increasing
in the size of the loss, and decreasing in probability of loss. That is, companies
are more willing to insure against larger, less frequent loss events.244
This risk management framing, however, is questionable in the
realm of cyber risk. “The classical risk management process consists of
five steps: the definition of goals, risk identification, risk evaluation/
analysis, the actual risk management (avoidance, mitigation, transfer,
retention), and finally, the monitoring of risk. In each step of the class-
ical risk management process, cyber risks show special
characteristics.”245
Data breaches simply are not always preventable, regardless of the
adequacy of security measures.246 Months before Target’s malware
breach in 2013, it invested $1.6 million in a malware detection tool,
and JPMorgan spent $250 million on prevention before it was
breached in 2014.247 Both events were due to simple human error.248
The sophistication of the entity can have little to do with the possibil-
ity of the breach.249 The technological aspects of security measures
renders them unmanageable and impossible to monitor internally for
effectiveness.250 The defining cyber characteristic of correlated failure
is that a vulnerability in a widely used software application could be
exploited.251 Different products share code, so one vulnerability may
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jeopardize whole lines of products.252 Another defining cyber charac-
teristic, interdependent security, means that a company’s network se-
curity is only as good as the other networks to which it is
connected.253 Neither of these characteristics can be addressed by in-
ternal preventative measures.
The decision not to insure for cyber risk taken by almost three-
quarters of U.S. companies is primarily related to the expense, but it
is also related to policy exclusions and the belief that coverage is inad-
equate due to the overwhelming liability exposure.254 Moral hazard
and national security concerns have resulted in legal prohibitions of
insuring against some forms of cyber risk, such as ransomware.255
The unpreventable risk further extends beyond the business constitu-
ency and applies also to the consumers, who have no control over how
their information is stored by the government or businesses and are
forced to trust these other constituencies.256 The lack of information
regarding highly technical subjects for both business and consumer
constituencies serves as a basic impediment to risk management.257
2. From the Insurance Perspective
Insurers view cyber insurance as a risk like no other because of
limited data and “the quick evolution and proliferation of threats.”258
Insurers have two decades of experience with cyber insurance,
But cyber insurance as a mass market product is still in its nascent stages;
the risks it seeks to cover are difficult to measure, model, and price. As one
economist noted, cyber coverage “is like insuring an aircraft in 1915—there’s
a lot more that we don’t know than we do know at this point.”259
The little amount of reliable data and information shared causes
skewed insurance calculations.260 Cyber risk stems from interdepen-
dencies, is subject to rapid change, and is characterized by a great
degree of uncertainty with respect to data and modeling.261 Informa-
tion is difficult to find, and insurers are left to use hypotheticals to
project losses.262 The information available to insurers is often biased
because its source is the cybersecurity industry or software developers
252. Riedy & Hanus, supra note 133, at 1103.
253. Romanosky et al., supra note 64, at 6.
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and is inherently unreliable because of the rapidly changing nature of
cyber risk.263
Because of the unique management challenge created by cyber
risk, insurers price premiums by guessing, outsourcing, basing premi-
ums on competitor pricing, or basing premiums on other types or lines
of insurance.264 These methods result in flat-rate pricing and heavy
reliance on asset value or revenue to base rates.265 Furthermore, pol-
icy premium calculation for small businesses ends up being simplistic
in its analysis of risk.266 It also appears that insurers’ lack of data has
left entities seeking insurance to independently determine the terms
and limits of their policies with less guidance from insurers than with
other lines of insurance.267 Despite underwriters having decades of
experience with cyber insurance, few carriers are confident in their
pricing models.268
Correlated failure in cybersecurity is a matter of concern for busi-
nesses, and it raises a serious challenge to the effectiveness of insur-
ance as a risk management tool for cyber risk at a fundamental level.
Insurance relies on risk pooling to mitigate risk:
From the insurer’s perspective, insurance is a risk-distribution device, that is,
a mechanism by which the insurer pools multiple risks of multiple insureds in
order to take advantage of “the law of large numbers.” This statistical phe-
nomenon is reflected in the financial world by the diversification of invest-
ment portfolios. It is embodied in the day-to-day world by the adage, “Don’t
put all your eggs in one basket.”
Many insureds who pay premiums will not incur losses. Insuring many inde-
pendent risks in return for numerous premiums thus serves to distribute risk,
in effect spreading a portion of the insurer’s potential liability among his in-
sureds. Distributing risk allows the insurer to reduce the possibility that a
single costly claim will exceed the amount taken in as a premium and set
aside for the payment of that claim.269
Insurance has successfully managed correlated loss, to a lesser ex-
tent, in other contexts including automobile insurance.270 Cyber risk
is globally connected, and the variety in production of IT systems is
limited by economies of scale, suggesting that the degree of correlated
failure in the cyber arena is much higher than what insurance has
managed before.271 This problem is exacerbated by the small pool cur-
rently available to manage that correlation and is considered by the
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insurance industry to be a barrier to insurability.272 A simple example
demonstrates the problem. An insurance company provides automo-
bile insurance for Bob and several million others; when Bob has an
accident, insurance can manage this risk because many more insureds
will not have an accident. This is true even when the loss is correlated
if, for example, Bob’s accident also involves Mary, who is also an in-
sured, or damages a gas station leading to extensive property damage.
Contrast this to the cyber context when Target may not suffer a loss,
but a Windows vulnerability may be exploited or Internet servers go
down, causing loss for significant portions of the insurer’s clientele.
The analogy of natural-disaster-type damages from a single incident
accurately illustrates correlated failure.273 It remains to be seen if the
simple expansion of insurance markets can alleviate this fundamental
issue.274
Insurance has shown itself to be unusually adept at regulating for
cybersecurity in an atmosphere where government has not.275 It also
holds a great deal of promise to serve as a tool for information collec-
tion and assessment. The resultant sharing with consumers and busi-
nesses is a powerful mechanism for education, in that it allows
constituent groups to understand and advocate for their best interests
despite the highly technical nature of the risk.276 In addition to im-
proving security through education, if constituents were educated as
to their best interests and could advocate politically, the response of
private and public law institutions might improve as well. To date, the
current insurance market has failed to reach this potential and a pri-
mary reason is the fundamental limitation of risk pooling with such
highly correlated risk.277
C. Current Cyber Coverage Is Inadequate
Insurance coverage for cyber risk comes both as endorsements to
other policies, such as to errors and omissions (E&O) policies, and as
standalone policies.278 The common first party and third party dis-
tinction crosses over from other insurance lines to cyber insurance:
[F]irst party coverage covers losses for costs incurred directly by the insured.
For example, it includes costs related to investigating the cause of a data
breach or security incident, costs associated with restoring business services,
the cost of notifying affected individuals, credit monitoring services, costs in-
curred from public relations and media services in order to communicate the
event, extortion and ransom payments, and losses associated with business
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interruption . . . . [T]hird party liability covers the cost of defending against
public or private litigation, settlements, judgments, or other rulings, as well
as fines, fees, and settlements stemming from these lawsuits.279
The development of policy language occurs through a long process
similar to a legislative process involving testing and market reaction,
including judicial information through case law.280 The result is the
use of standardized forms prepared by the Insurance Services Office,
Inc. (ISO).281 The most typical type of commercial insurance is Com-
mercial General Liability (CGL) insurance, and the business constitu-
ency views these policies as the first line of recovery in risk
management.282 In 2014, the ISO adopted new standard form exclu-
sions for cyber risk in CGL policies in an effort to encourage the
purchase of standalone cyber insurance policies.283 Insurers have vig-
orously maintained that CGL policies do not cover cyber risk, even in
policies predating the 2014 ISO form exclusions.284
1. Coverage Not Widespread
Only 24% of companies have insurance coverage for cyber loss.285
This is despite the fact that companies value their information assets
higher than PP&E assets.286 Only 15% of information assets are in-
sured as opposed to 59% of PP&E assets.287 Companies elect to self-
insure information assets twice as often as they elect to self-insure
PP&E assets.288 The likelihood of a major loss to information assets,
however, is approximately four times that of PP&E.289 Companies
further recognize that probable maximum loss (PML) from a cyber
event is higher than PML for PP&E assets.290 More than half of com-
panies suffered a significant breach in the last two years and acknowl-
edge that risk is increasing, but almost half still have no plan to
purchase cyber insurance.291 Companies are more likely to report
losses to PP&E assets than information assets, and almost one-third
of companies believe disclosure of data breaches in financial state-
ments is not required.292 Most coverage is in the United States.293
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Many European companies are unaware the coverage exists, and the
market in Europe is less than a tenth of that in the United States.294
Overall coverage rates in the United Kingdom are only around 2%.295
Market incentives are inadequate to convince companies of their
need for insurance.296 Market behavior further affects the ability of
insurance to serve as a regulator because trends indicate that firms
elect not to purchase insurance until after they are breached. This be-
havior is concerning to insurers and affects premiums because it im-
plies adverse selection, or the choice to purchase insurance rather
than improve security.297 Although lack of education plays a role in
this,298 other factors affect this decision-making, including expense,
exclusions, and inadequacy of coverage versus risk.299
2. Coverage Mirrors Regulation Instead of Risk
A troubling trend is that coverage is mirroring regulation. The de-
velopment of the insurance market has been in response to regulation,
not to non-regulatory risk.300 A recent example is the adoption of SEC
regulations boosting the cyber insurance market.301 Similarly, the
coverage landscape supports this notion with data regulated indus-
tries, such as healthcare, which have higher rates of insurance cover-
age than other fields.302 This coverage does not reflect overall risk.
Healthcare, retail, and technology sectors have the highest rates of
coverage at around 50%,303 whilst the financial services sector is at-
tacked three times more than any other.304 Regulation also appears to
be determinative of policy limits, with regulation causing limits to
rise305
Empirical research into insurance serving as an effective regulator
provides a warning in the cybersecurity context. Although insurance
has been surprisingly adept at regulating in this field, insurance in
highly regulated spheres, such as Employment Practice Liability In-
surance (EPLI), has led insurance companies to move away from dis-
couragement of illegal conduct into litigation avoidance.306 For
example, rather than teaching an insured’s employees not to illegally
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discriminate, insurers may instruct employers to insert venue clauses
in contracts or insert these clauses into insurance contracts them-
selves to limit availability of damages (i.e., punitive damages) or ap-
plicable coverage.307
Corporate Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance (D&O cover-
age) provides another example in which insurance could act as a regu-
lator but has elected not to, thus providing little guidance and
preventative education.308 Put more harshly, D&O policies have be-
come mechanisms that allow directors and officers to use shareholder
capital to purchase insurance against shareholder lawsuits.309
Purchase of insurance is not conditioned on any preventative mea-
sures, and no effort is made by insurers to influence corporate con-
duct.310 This type of negative behavior by insurance companies tends
to thrive in an atmosphere characterized by a lack of judicial informa-
tion and broad, undeveloped legal standards.311 In this environment,
risk is equated with law, and litigation is viewed as inevitable. This
perception, in turn, creates incentives for insurance to focus on lobby-
ing and litigation avoidance rather than education and prevention.312
Cyber risk is characterized both by broad standards, such as the
FTC’s reasonable and appropriate data security for personal informa-
tion standard,313 and the corresponding failure to define or provide
guidance as to what is reasonable.314 Cyber insurance is plagued by a
lack of judicial information.315 These characteristics of cyber risk sug-
gest that the potential of insurer as regulator in the cyber ecosystem is
in jeopardy.
3. Coverage Is Difficult to Obtain
The cyber insurance market for consumers is still far less devel-
oped than that for business constituents facing informational and edu-
cational difficulties:
Besides the low coverage of cyber risk in businesses, the market of cyber in-
surance for individuals is even less well-developed. There exist only very few
personal cyber insurance products, and most people are not even aware of
their existence. A study conducted by YouGov (2014) estimates that only one
per cent of individuals possesses cyber insurance. However, the potential for
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such products seems to be huge, as the survey finds that 19 per cent of the
participants would be willing to buy such a product.316
In addition to the lack of knowledge regarding policy availability,
the arguably largest risk facing consumers is the lack of information
and resources explaining the risks and methods to protect them-
selves.317 As data breaches continue to receive media attention, con-
sumers become more numb to the risk.318 Again, this evinces that the
location of coverage amongst constituencies does not reflect the risk. A
most vulnerable constituency has the least insurance, suggesting a
failure of the insurance marketplace.
Coverage for business constituents can be difficult to obtain for
several reasons. First, companies may struggle to find coverage at
all.319 Second, there is wild variation between policies.320 Unlike
cyber exclusions for CGL policies, cyber policy forms are not yet devel-
oped by the ISO, and development of standards is not on the hori-
zon.321 Policies are highly negotiable.322 Cyber insurance does not
have its own line of insurance for industry classification purposes, but
is spread across multiple lines.323 It is regulated differently in each
U.S. state.324 It requires expert assistance to purchase, and the
purchase of unnecessary double coverage is a risk along with under
coverage.325
“[The] cyber insurance market is referred to as the ‘Wild West’ of
insurance, as new policies are created on a regular basis and as old
policies are constantly updated and revised.”326 Consideration of these
policies can be a daunting task. Banks, for example, must consider
whether and to what degree to insure with the following types of cov-
erage: forensic investigation coverage, crisis management cost cover-
age, notification or credit monitoring cost coverage, litigation and
privacy liability expense coverage, regulatory defense and penalties
coverage, online defamation and copyright and trademark infringe-
ment coverage, network business interruption coverage, general ex-
pense coverage, data loss and restoration coverage, cyber extortion
coverage, computer fraud coverage, and improper electronic transfer
of funds coverage.327 Each of these coverages has individual complexi-
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ties. For example, business interruption coverage will specify a wait-
ing period or down time before coverage is triggered and different
coverages may have sub-limits.328
Beyond coverages, key exclusions must also be considered, includ-
ing: prior acts, laptop and/or mobile device exclusions, bodily injury
and property damage exclusions, mechanical or electronic failure ex-
clusions, acts of war, employment practices exclusions, ERISA exclu-
sions, illegal or fraudulent acts exclusions, insured exclusions,
exclusion severability, regulatory exclusions, negligence exclusions,
preferred vendor requirements, and reasonable security measure ex-
clusions.329 The interaction of the cyber coverage with the existing in-
surance coverage must be further explored, and cyber coverage must
be reviewed with respect to existing D&O coverage, E&O coverage,
CGL coverage, fiduciary liability insurance, EPLI coverage, and crime
or fidelity coverage.330
On top of considering the various coverages, exclusions, and inter-
action with other policies, cyber policies are now offered by more than
500 insurance companies, and shopping for policies involves consider-
able effort and independent negotiation for terms with competing in-
surers.331 Insurance brokers traditionally serve to assist in advising
on policy provisions and shopping needs for different insureds.332 Bro-
kers, however, recognize that, like flood insurance, cyber insurance is
rife with possible broker malpractice claims. Cyber insurance from the
broker’s perspective is more dangerous because of the variation in
policies.333
4. Coverage Is Expensive
When engaged, insurers serve well as regulators of cyber risk,334
but this engagement and the overwhelming nature of the risk has led
cyber insurance to be expensive.335 The ratio of premiums to coverage
limits is three times higher for cyber insurance than other liability
policies and is six times higher than property insurance.336 Increased
regulation and the recent success of class action suits will lead to fur-
ther increases.337 Target and Anthem faced a tripling of insurance
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premiums after breaches.338 Anthem agreed to a $25 million deducti-
ble in order to obtain $100 million in limits.339 Typical premiums can
range in the hundreds of thousands.340 The expense of policies is par-
ticularly harmful and potentially prohibitive to small businesses that
face an increasing majority of attacks.341 The costs of third party in-
surance is even higher.342 Due to uncertainty and high risk, insurers
seek lower limits.343 Deductibles have risen and few companies secure
policy limits beyond $15 million regardless of the exploding losses.344
Limits, in general, are too small when compared to the risk.345
5. Obtained Coverage Is Illusory
In addition to lower limits, insurers respond to uncertain cyber
risk with strict exclusions.346 The greatest variation between cyber
insurance policies is in their exclusions.347 Although cyber insurance
has value in prevention and as a regulator, serious concern remains
about what policies cover. Standalone policies are marketed as “a flex-
ible insurance solution designed by cyber risk experts to address the
full breadth of risks associated with doing business in today’s technol-
ogy-dependent world,” and as covering “direct loss, legal liability and
consequential damages resulting from cyber security breaches.”348
When claims are made for common cybersecurity issues, they are
often vigorously denied under policy language and exclusions.349 For
example, in 2014, P.F. Chang’s suffered a loss of customer credit card
information, and its credit card service, Bank of America Merchant
Services (BAMS), was contractually responsible to MasterCard for
fees and assessments for the breach.350 In turn, P.F. Chang’s reim-
bursed BAMS and sought coverage under a standalone cyber pol-
icy.351 Coverage was denied by the insurer because, under policy
language, coverage was limited to privacy injuries, which consumers
had suffered, but BAMS had not.352 A court agreed, granting sum-
338. Shackelford, supra note 92, at 15–16.
339. Id. at 16.
340. Id. at 15.
341. Bonner, supra note 80, at 274.
342. Romanosky et al., supra note 64, at 32.
343. ELING & SCHNELL, supra note 41, at 16.
344. PONEMON INST., supra note 77, at 13.
345. Smith, supra note 81, at 408.
346. ELING & SCHNELL, supra note 41, at 16.
347. Romanosky et al., supra note 64, at 11.
348. Roddy, supra note 106, at 85 (quoting marketing materials noted in P.F. Chang’s
China Bistro, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., No. CV-15-01322-PHX-SMM, 2016 WL
3055111, at *1 (D. Ariz. May 31, 2016)).
349. GILMORE & ARMILLEI, supra note 157, at 6.
350. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, 2016 WL 3055111, at *1–2.
351. Id. at *2.
352. Id.
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mary judgment on the coverage issue in favor of the insurer.353 Ob-
servers have commented that half of common data breach scenarios
are arguably excluded from common standalone policies and, to date,
the insurance industry has been aggressively pursuing exclusions.354
Several of these exclusions are worth independent discussion.
Fifty-nine percent of all security breaches involve some form of
human negligence.355 This type of breach has been responsible for
some of the most damaging security breaches, including breaches of
Target and JPMorgan.356 Many policies exclude coverage of damage
from these breaches under policy language that requires, “Insured[s]
to continuously implement the procedures and risk controls identified
in the Insured’s application for . . . insurance.”357 Similarly, policies
require reasonable security measures for an insured to have coverage,
and industry standard security measures may not be enough.358 At
the time of Anthem’s breach in early 2015, for example, it was not
industry standard for a health insurance company to encrypt personal
information including Social Security numbers.359 The reasonable se-
curity standard is further problematic with respect to regulation be-
cause the FTC uses a similar standard for prosecution.360 Under this
type of breach, therefore, FTC prosecution could result in the loss of
insurance coverage.
Policies now exclude liability for statutory and regulatory viola-
tions.361 This is problematic because companies may be caught be-
tween regulatory schemes and trying, for example, to protect data
under one regime, like HIPAA, without violating the Patriot Act in the
example of ransomware.362 Regardless if the company chooses to pay
the ransom or not, this exclusion could apply. It is important to note
the trend of companies to insure only after breaches and in response
to regulation.363 The concern is that companies may purchase insur-
ance to protect themselves from a risk that is specifically excluded by
policies. Furthermore, no insurance market may exist for coverage un-
til and unless regulation is in place.
353. Id. at *9.
354. Dominitz, supra note 208, at 33–34.
355. Podolak, supra note 86, at 372.
356. See Eastman, supra note 2, at 517–18.
357. Dominitz, supra note 208, at 34 (quoting policy language at issue in Columbia
Cas. Co. v. Cottage Health Sys., No. CV-15-03432-DDP-AGRX, 2015 WL
4497730, at *1 (C.D. Cal. July 17, 2015) (case settled prior to disposition)).
358. Podolak, supra note 86, at 407.
359. Id. at 373, 407–08.
360. See Rosenberg, supra note 56, at 1179.
361. Gordon, supra note 60, at 201.
362. DeMuro, supra note 42, at 372–73.
363. See ELING & SCHNELL, supra note 41, at 31; Gordon, supra note 60, at 195–96;
Shackelford, supra note 92, at 14.
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Most risk in cybersecurity is cybercrime.364 “Intentional hacking is
by far the most common cause of stolen or compromised data.”365 Re-
gardless, the single most common exclusion in cyber insurance policies
is for criminal activity.366 At least half exclude extortion and ran-
som.367 Even determining whether a policy covers hacking is challeng-
ing. Some insurers employ an exclusion that “expressly require[s] that
a loss be directly caused by, or solely and directly caused by, an in-
sured cause.”368 In 2014, Sony fell victim to this type of policy exclu-
sion when its PlayStation Network was breached.369 During
litigation, the trial court agreed with the insurer, Zurich, and upheld
the clause.370 The language in this type of clause excludes coverage
for all losses due to hacking.
The vast majority of policies further exclude acts of war or terror-
ism.371 It has been suggested that this exclusion might be viable in
the cyber context, both with respect to CGL and standalone poli-
cies.372 Although courts traditionally interpret this type of exclusion
narrowly, it still poses a risk in the cyber arena with its attribution
complexities.373 The war analogy, frequently used in U.S. politics (i.e.,
the War on Drugs), has been applied to cyberattacks and this rhetoric
is increasing.374
The contractor-coverage issue that arose in P.F. Chang’s may arise
under many policies that purport to be third party policies. In that
case, coverage was lost because damage was done to an unanticipated
third-party claim (at least unanticipated by P.F. Chang’s) from a
credit card service provider.375 Yet another type of third-party issue
arises and challenges the value or viability of cyber insurance. The
inherent nature of the digital world relies on third parties much more
than the physical world. Losses of Internet service and power outages
are examples of reliance on third-parties. Many cyber insurance poli-
cies will exclude coverage for events like these.376 Exclusions for inde-
pendent contractors common in policies may lead to many coverage
364. Shackelford, supra note 92, at 4.
365. Riedy & Hanus, supra note 133, at 1103.
366. Romanosky et al., supra note 64, at 14.
367. Id. at 16.
368. Gordon, supra note 60, at 201 (quoting Podolak, supra note 86, at 405).
369. See Podolak, supra note 86, at 390 (discussing Zurich Am. Ins. v. Sony Corp. of
Am., 2014 WL 3253541 at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 24, 2014)).
370. Id.
371. Romanosky et al., supra note 64, at 14.
372. Doherty, supra note 93, at 16.
373. Id. at 16–17.
374. See generally Rowe, supra note 3, at 394–403.
375. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., CV-15-01322-PHX-SMM, 2016
WL 3055111, at *1–2 (D. Ariz. May 31, 2016).
376. Romanosky et al., supra note 64, at 14.
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disputes going forward.377 The 2013 Target breach was accomplished
using credentials of an independent contractor.378
Cyber policies were intended to fill gaps in coverage following ISO
form changes excluding cyber risk issues.379 Actual policy language is
now creating new gaps between policies. For example, a CGL policy
might exclude electronic data as property to avoid property damage
claims resulting from cyber loss, but the cyber insurance policy meant
to fill this gap might also exclude any data loss resulting from a physi-
cal cause or loss of tangible property.380 The result is that if a data
loss is caused by property damage, there is neither coverage under the
CGL nor the cyber insurance policy.381
6. Adequate Coverage from the Private Market Is Unsustainable
The efforts of insurers to exclude coverage is understandable con-
sidering ballooning losses, lack of information, correlated failure
preventing effective risk pooling, and the great efforts and expense
insurers have taken to be positive regulators of their insureds.382 A
primary concern of the insurance industry is simply whether cyber
risk is insurable.383 The financial sector has taken note of the insura-
bility issue facing cyber risk management. Moody’s, Standard &
Poor’s, and Fitch, financial service companies which publish analysis
of investments, all have warned that they will consider downgrading
insurers for writing aggressive (adequate) standalone cyber poli-
cies.384 Standard & Poor’s went as far as instructing insurers to avoid
reliance on data in writing policies because of uncertainty—advising
insurers instead to set low limits and strict exclusions to avoid scru-
tiny by rating agencies and potential downgrading.385
The efforts of insurers along these lines makes the purchase of
these policies questionable.386 “While lawyers often counsel insured to
buy standalone cyber coverage on top of CGL, even the combination of
the two may not be enough to protect the insured from costly losses in
377. Nathan L. Colvin & Timothy C. Dougherty, Trends for Potential Insurance Cover-
age for Losses Arising from a Data Breach, 44 N. KY. L. REV. 29, 34 (2017).
378. Id.
379. See Podolak, supra note 86, at 403–04.
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. ELING & SCHNELL, supra note 41, at 16 (discussing why insurers seek to avoid
coverage in the cyber context); GILMORE & ARMILLEI, supra note 157, at 5–6, 14
(discussing efforts of insurers); Schwarcz, supra note 207, at 1500–01 (discussing
the lack of judicial information available to insurers); Talesh, supra note 217, at
475–85 (discussing positive, proactive efforts of insurers and how this has made
them effective regulators).
383. ELING & SCHNELL, supra note 41, at 10, 29.
384. Id. at 16.
385. Id.
386. Smith, supra note 81, at 408.
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the event of a cyber attack.”387 Moreover, the more insurers seek to
limit coverage through exclusions, the less they regulate effec-
tively.388 Observers have gone as far as to question whether cyber pol-
icies will even continue to be underwritten.389 The current insurance
market “create[s] a perfect storm that will likely lead to claims of cov-
erage gaps, misplaced coverage and improper coverage.”390 Tradi-
tional elements of the insurance relationship, such as the relationship
between insurance broker and client, are ineffective in this context.391
If Sony, Target, P.F. Chang’s, and Anthem, with cadres of in-house
and outside counsel and vast resources to obtain consulting on insur-
ance, cannot negotiate this market, it is unreasonable to expect Bob’s
Bait Shop, which digitalizes personal information for purposes of
game and fish licensing and accepts credit cards, to have any success.
Unfortunately, the hacker’s target de jour is a business like Bob’s.
V. CYBER INSURANCE IS VITAL FOR CYBER
RISK MANAGEMENT
Without insurance, the risk management outlook is bleak:
[U]sers are largely helpless, firms are largely unknowledgeable, software is
generally insecure, federal agencies are generally impotent to bring about
meaningful change in the structure and operation of private markets, and at-
tackers are largely judgement-proof. As an initial matter, it would offer con-
sumers redress when cyber-incidents occur. But, more importantly, insurance
and insurers play a regulatory role. They collect and study information about
best practices, they train and educate their customers, they engage with other
institutional actors in ways that can improve the overall quality of the secur-
ity ecosystem, and they lobby for legislative and regulatory changes that re-
duce their exposure to risk—which, in the security context, means lobbying to
reduce overall risk.392
The use of electronic devices and the Internet is essential to our
daily life from the personal uses of e-mail, shopping, social media, en-
tertainment, and geolocation to our business uses of networks.393
Businesses cannot afford to be without insurance and will not remain
competitive without it.394 Improved security and insurance against
losses will become more important to new economic developments con-
sidering the risk associated with autonomous vehicles and aircraft
387. Romanosky et al., supra note 64, at 33 (internal citation omitted).
388. Hurwitz, supra note 66, at 1537–38.
389. Bonner, supra note 80, at 273.
390. LaRosa & Campbell, supra note 321, at 63.
391. See id.
392. Hurwitz, supra note 66, at 1500.
393. Rosenberg, supra note 56, at 1163–64.
394. Gordon, supra note 60, at 184–86.
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control systems.395 The DHS recognizes the critical nature of a vi-
brant cyber insurance market to overall security.396 Losses are com-
mon and will affect many businesses.397 It is worth repeating that
cyber insecurity is potentially the United States’ Achilles’ heel.398
VI. FEDERAL CYBER INSURANCE: A SOLUTION TO
CYBER RISK MANAGEMENT
In sum, the current cyber risk management ecosystem faces tre-
mendous losses with little data about them. Potential remedies trigger
competing constituent and political interests. Correlated losses chal-
lenge traditional notions of the working of insurance resulting in un-
dercapitalization. Constituencies lack sufficient information to act in
their best interest. National security institutions have narrowed pos-
sible responses through their own cyber activity. Other public law in-
stitutions fail to regulate effectively. Private law provides little or no
remedy to those harmed. And the security failures keep coming, and
coming, and coming.
A. Public/Private Collaboration Is Required
National cybersecurity depends on public and private cooperation
because so much of the nation’s critical infrastructure is private.399
Moreover, the security of communications and information systems,
including voice, data, video, and Internet, is indispensable to all other
critical industries in the United States.400 The private sector, how-
ever, has inadequate incentives to spend on security.401 Recognizing
an unusual circumstance in which national security depends so heav-
ily on the private sector, President Obama opined that the only solu-
tion to the country’s cybersecurity woes is through public and private
collaboration:
First, this has to be a shared mission. So much of our computer networks and
critical infrastructure are in the private sector, which means government can-
not do this alone. But the fact is that the private sector can’t do it alone either,
because it’s government that often has the latest information on new threats.
There’s only one way to defend America from these cyber threats, and that is
395. See Caleb Kennedy, Note, New Threats to Vehicle Safety: How Cybersecurity Pol-
icy Will Shape the Future of Autonomous Vehicles, 23 MICH. TELECOM. & TECH. L.
REV. 343, 343–50 (2017).
396. Gordon, supra note 60, at 202.
397. PONEMON INST., supra note 77, at 24.
398. See Trautman, supra note 45, at 386.
399. See Eastman, supra note 2, at 519–20, 528–31.
400. Public Safety Tech Topic #20, supra note 44.
401. Eastman, supra note 2, at 522, 529–31.
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through government and industry working together, sharing appropriate in-
formation as true partners.402
Collaboration has the potential to reduce the detection gap be-
tween cyberattack and detection.403 Public and private cooperation
and information sharing can assist the insurance industry with better
data for premium calculations, and government backstops could alle-
viate risk concerns and affect risk pooling.404 Academic formulations
of global security approaches are available and the financial sector,
one of the first data-regulated sectors, has served as a test bed for
security approaches.405 Public and private information sharing aided
in mitigating attacks on ten major U.S. banks in 2012 and 2013.406
More collaboration is necessary and has the potential to mitigate
cyber losses, but even financial institutions hesitate to share informa-
tion with the public, the government, and each other because of liabil-
ity concerns.407 Industry has focused on seeking safe harbor
provisions in law,408 but adequate and reliable insurance could pro-
vide the same comfort to permit information sharing.
The insurance industry recognizes that cyber risk is a problem of
international scope and needs consideration at a national level.409
Commentators have further noted that law enforcement related to
cybersecurity needs to come from a federal level.410 Somewhat over-
looked acts by the federal government have had dramatic, positive im-
pacts on cyber insurance. After exclusions of cyber risk were
formalized in ISO forms in 2014,411 the Federal Insurance Office clas-
sified cyber liability policies as qualifying under TRIP and required
standalone cyber insurance policies to comply with TRIA effective
April 2017.412 This move encouraged the development of the
standalone cyber insurance policy market.413 TRIA, however, is not
designed to address data breaches, but only acts of terrorism that
manifest in damage to physical infrastructure, like the Natanz
attack.414
402. Barack Obama, Former U.S. President, Remarks on Signing an Executive Order
on Promoting Private Sector Cybersecurity Information Sharing in Stanford, Cal-
ifornia, in DAILY COMP. PRES. DOCS. (Feb. 13, 2015), at 3–4.
403. Lawrence et al., supra note 34, at 43–46.
404. Id. at 46, 52.
405. Gordon, supra note 60, at 203–08.
406. Johnson, supra note 58, at 284–85.
407. Id. at 297–98.
408. Id. at 298–99.
409. ELING & SCHNELL, supra note 41, at 35.
410. Trautman, supra note 45, at 355.
411. GILMORE & ARMILLEI, supra note 157, at 2.
412. Roddy, supra note 106, at 84.
413. See Romanosky et al., supra note 64, at 4.
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Cyber insurance is one of the two most commonly suggested mech-
anisms for improving the cybersecurity ecosystem as a whole, but it
faces pragmatic and logistical problems related to the insurance in-
dustry’s unwillingness to underwrite broad policies.415 The insurance
industry has voiced willingness and has suggested public and private
partnerships, including government mandated minimal security, in-
formation sharing, government backstops for extreme risk scenarios,
better criminal enforcement, and anonymous reporting of security is-
sues.416 There is little doubt that the U.S. government must step in to
address this weighty security issue.417
B. Defining the Threat Matrix
Before discussing different models of federal insurance programs
and considering their potential application in cyber risk management,
it is helpful to consider and classify the nature of cyber threats. For
this purpose, this section will rely on Steven M. Bellovin’s classifica-
tion of threats in his book Thinking Security.418 Bellovin classifies at-
tackers by skill and determination or “degree of focus” as “joy
hackers,” “opportunistic hackers,” “targetiers,” or “advanced persis-
tent threats.”419
Joy hackers fit the stereotypical teenager in his parents’ basement,
having little skill or focus.420 The hacking has little purpose other
than potentially gaining knowledge.421 Joy hackers can inflict dam-
age, but ordinary care suffices for protection.422 If security is suffi-
cient, they will attack an easier target.423 Joy hackers can develop
more focus and become targetiers or develop skill and become opportu-
nistic hackers.424 In the 1990s, this was the most common type of
hacker.425 Now, however, most hackers have more specific motivation,
whether pursuing criminal goals or hacktivism.426
Opportunistic hackers are more dangerous because of skill level.427
They have an arsenal of vulnerabilities and techniques including zero
days, but the attacks are random—only targeting if paid to or if they
415. Hurwitz, supra note 66, at 1497–99.
416. ELING & SCHNELL, supra note 41, at 10, 35–36.
417. Smith, supra note 81, at 408.
418. See BELLOVIN, supra note 36.
419. Id. at 34–35.
420. Id.
421. Id. at 35.
422. Id.
423. Id.
424. Id. at 34–35.
425. Id. at 32.
426. Id.
427. Id. at 35.
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are annoyed by a target.428 This group may be the most important to
defend against.429
Targetiers are quite dangerous—aiming at a target and even
dumpster diving to gain reconnaissance.430 Even with low skills, dan-
gerous methods can be purchased, even zero days.431 Some are insid-
ers out for revenge and already possess knowledge of a network.432
They may also be paid to attack a target.433
The last and most dangerous classification of hackers is advanced
persistent threats (APTs).434 These attackers possess good intelli-
gence and technical skill and make defense a difficult task.435 Intelli-
gence will allow these attackers to work around the strongest
cryptography instead of through it.436 Reconnaissance will be gained
through burglary, bribery, and blackmail, and the vulnerabilities ex-
ploited will not always be online.437 Efforts towards security will not
be sufficient.438 Levels of APTs range from sophisticated criminals,
sometimes in government employ, like Alberto Gonzalez, to nation
states, like Israel and the United States with Stuxnet.439
Possible models of federal insurance programs may be based on the
previously used classification of cybersecurity constituency groups:
consumers, investors, businesses, law enforcement, government, and
national security entities.440
C. Federal Insurance Models
Federal insurance programs are pervasive. Provision of insurance
consumes so much of the budget that the United States has been re-
ferred to as “an insurance company with an army.”441 Beyond health-
care, the U.S. government insures crops, livestock, individuals
administering smallpox countermeasures, the domestic airline indus-
try from war risk, U.S. investors from political risk in foreign coun-
tries, the maritime industry from war risk, pension benefits, losses
from nuclear accidents, flood losses, bank and credit union deposits,
428. Id.
429. Id.
430. Id.
431. Id.
432. Id.
433. Id.
434. Id. at 34–37.
435. Id. at 36–37.
436. Id. at 39.
437. Id.
438. Id.
439. Id. at 33, 36–37.
440. Trautman, supra note 45, at 351.
441. Paul Krugman, Opinion, An Insurance Company with an Army, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
27, 2011, 8:08 AM), https://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/04/27/an-insurance-
company-with-an-army/.
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commercial space launches, and commercial losses to terrorism.442
These programs are managed by a variety of federal agencies and
most were adopted during three time periods: in the 1930s Great De-
pression period, in the early 1970s, and in the early 2000s in response
to the 9/11 attacks.443 They insure vast amounts of assets ranging in
premiums written at levels similar to that of the current cyber insur-
ance markets (crop and livestock insurance) to amounts that exceed
the private insurance market entirely.444 For example, in 2003 the
FDIC insured more than $2.9 trillion in bank deposits, and the Pen-
sion Benefit Guaranty Corporation insured more than $2.2 trillion in
corporate retirement benefits.445 On a different level altogether,
Medicare and Medicaid currently expend in excess of $1 trillion per
year combined.446
The purpose of this Comment is to begin a discussion about a fed-
eral insurance program for cyber risk management. It discusses three
models of federal insurance to start this dialogue: federal backstop in-
surance (commercial space launch insurance and TRIP), FDIC cover-
age of bank deposits, and NFIP. Each of these models and the risk
they intend to address contain parallels to cyber risk management is-
sues discussed above. This short discussion serves as a starting point
to scratch the surface of complex policy. Full analysis of the programs
would require vast analysis not possible herein.
1. Federal Backstop Insurance (TRIP and Commercial Space
Law)
Before 9/11, insurance companies did not address terrorism as a
risk because of small, uncorrelated losses.447 After the 9/11 attacks,
banks required commercial projects to obtain terrorism coverage prior
to funding.448 No market, however, existed for this insurance because
insurers and reinsurers left the market through exclusions.449 Large
commercial projects faltered.450 To stabilize the insurance market and
442. Insurance Programs, CTR. FED. FIN. INSTITUTIONS (Aug. 26, 2004), https://web
.archive.org/web/20040826092919/http:/www.coffi.org:80/pubs/Insurance%20Pro
grams%20Rev1.pdf.
443. See id.
444. See id.
445. Id.
446. NHE Fact Sheet, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/
research-statistics-data-and-systems/statistics-trends-and-reports/national
healthexpenddata/nhe-fact-sheet.html [https://perma.unl.edu/G3RS-MMBL] (last
updated Apr. 17, 2018).
447. Andrew Gerrish, Note, Terror CATs: TRIA’s Failure to Encourage a Private Mar-
ket for Terrorism Insurance and How Federal Securitization of Terrorism Risk
May Be a Viable Alternative, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1825, 1827 (2011).
448. Id. at 1828.
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encourage the development of adequate private terrorism insurance,
TRIA was adopted in 2002 with its corresponding program, TRIP.451
This program, meant to be temporary, but having been extended,
places the government in the place of reinsurer.452 Should losses due
to terrorism exceed thresholds and qualifying insurers suffer enough
losses, the government will step in to cover most losses over the
threshold amounts.453 It requires insurers to disclose information and
offer insurance meeting guidelines to qualify for the reinsurance.454
In addition to premium surcharges and other mechanisms to offset
government expenditure,455 it extended jurisdiction for terrorism vic-
tims to attach assets of foreign countries for terrorism damages.456
Similarly, the Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984 and the
SPACE Act of 2015 require businesses and government to undertake
risk analysis (calculating maximum probable loss) as part of the space
launch licensing regime.457 Once done, the business constituent must
provide insurance or demonstrate financial responsibility up to the
maximum probable loss, but not exceeding a cap of $500 million for
third-party claims, $100 million for U.S. government claims, or the
amount of insurance available on the world market at a reasonable
rate.458 The regime requires that the insurance cover all participants
including government, businesses, and third parties, and enforces a
waiver of claims between the interested parties to a launch.459 The
government then reinsures claims beyond the maximum probable loss
up to $1.5 billion.460 The purpose of these statutes is to promote com-
mercial development in an inherently risky environment, recognizing
commercial space activities as high risk, high reward endeavors.461
More specifically with respect to insurance, the legislation is intended
to create an adequate pool of insurability.462
The backstop model is attractive in the context of cyber risk man-
agement for several reasons. First, it could address the risk that busi-
ness and consumer constituents can never expect to address without
government and national security intervention, APTs, and the ex-
treme damages and correlated losses that result from APT attacks.
451. Id. at 1829.
452. Id.
453. See id. at 1831–32.
454. Roddy, supra note 106, at 84.
455. Gerrish, supra note 447, at 1832–37.
456. Rachel Waters, Note, Banking on Jurisdiction: Weinstein v. Islamic Republic of
Iran, 3 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 191, 201–02 (2013).
457. 51 U.S.C. § 50914(a)(1) (Supp. 2016).
458. Id. § 50914(a)(1), (3).
459. Id. § 50914(a)(4)–(5).
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Second, it could foster insurance market development by requiring
risk analysis and capping private market losses. Federal insurance
programs currently insure larger amounts of assets and pay out more
than the private market can sustain.463 Federal backstop insurance
provides potentially limitless market capitalization to facilitate risk
pooling, both by providing federal resources and by requiring large en-
tities to insure as a regulatory matter. This capitalization could per-
mit underwriting of policies that do not exclude common cyber events
and regulatory policy provisions would take the place of judicial infor-
mation. Third, it could provide a vehicle to share information between
business and government who jointly share risk and liability for
losses. Fourth, it could promote education by requiring disclosure of
risk to those purchasing insurance from government to insurer to bus-
iness or consumer purchaser. Fifth, the backstop programs may ad-
dress the attribution problem, which can be problematic in both space
vehicle accidents and terrorist attacks like in cyberattacks or security
failures. Commercial space law places responsibility for inherent, una-
voidable risk on the launcher with a government backstop. TRIA
places responsibility for terrorist losses on an insurer with a govern-
ment backstop. Finally, TRIA provides a model for government to
recoup insurance costs and provides jurisdictional expansion for con-
sumers to recover against foreign actor APTs.
2. FDIC
FDIC coverage is federal backstop in reverse, covering an amount
of loss up to a cap. Hundreds of banks failed each year in the 1920s.464
This accelerated in the 1930s because of withdrawal requests causing
banks to restrict credit and created a disastrous cycle. As banks
sought liquidity and consumer confidence plummeted, runs acceler-
ated further, which caused banks to again seek more liquidity.465 This
cycle began to victimize large urban banks including the Bank of the
United States in New York, one of the country’s largest.466 Eventu-
ally, this created an unusual circumstance where those concerned
with losses due to bank failure and those concerned with the
survivability of the banking structure as a whole were united in alarm
to an extent that allowed legislation.467 At the root of the problem was
a toxic mix of failed government bank policies and poor bank manage-
463. See Insurance Programs, supra note 442; Romanosky et al., supra note 64, at 3
(demonstrating the 2003 FDIC insurance level of $2.9 trillion as compared with
the 2015 market capitalization of cyberinsurance of $2 billion).
464. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION: THE FIRST
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ment, including speculation with deposits.468 Put in terms of constitu-
ents, consumers suffered losses beyond their control because of a toxic
mix of bad business and poor government policy.
The FDIC was created with the Glass-Steagall Act as part of the
Banking Act of 1933, which limited the interaction of commercial and
investment banking.469 The effect of insurance was immediate, and by
1934, bank deposits increased by almost one-quarter and banks
stopped failing. It was so successful that industry opposition to accom-
panying regulation evaporated.470 In order to qualify for insurance,
banks had to meet capital requirements, realistic future earnings
prospect requirements, quality management standards, and service of
the community standards.471 Insurance rates were based on one-
twelfth of a percent of total bank deposits, half of the anticipated rate,
and banks were not required to purchase FDIC stock as originally
thought necessary.472 Many emergency measures permitted to the
FDIC by the Banking Act, such as issuing notes, never became
necessary.473
The FDIC model is attractive in the context of cyber risk manage-
ment for several reasons. First, it is the only federal insurance model
that focuses primarily on the consumer. Just like looking for the
“FDIC” sticker on the bank door, consumers could vet credit cards,
financial institutions, investments, and even retail stores and online
shopping websites by looking for a simple label. This would allow a
consumer to rapidly assess his or her privacy interest without becom-
ing educated in technology or security. Second, it could have a dra-
matic effect on basic security. For a small portion of per transaction
costs, likely less than credit card processing fees, businesses could
purchase per transaction or per consumer insurance so long as they
met a set level of basic security measures. Very basic security methods
can prevent four-fifths of breaches.474 These protocols have been de-
veloped, but they need consistent application.475 The backstop model
addresses APT attacks and the FDIC model addresses the other three
threat types with great affect against joy hackers and opportunistic
hackers.
468. Id. at 33–39.
469. Banking Act of 1933, H.R. 5661, 73d Cong., 48 Stat. 162.
470. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 464, at 49–50.
471. Id. at 52.
472. Id.
473. Id. at 52–53.
474. Rowe, supra note 3, at 415.
475. See, e.g., BELLOVIN, supra note 36, at 203–89; Gordon, supra note 60, at 203–08.
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3. NFIP
The last model considered is flood insurance. “The three basic com-
ponents of the NFIP are: (1) the identification and mapping of flood-
prone communities, (2) the requirement that communities adopt and
enforce floodplain management regulations that meet certain mini-
mum eligibility criteria in order to qualify for flood insurance, and
(3) the provision of flood insurance.”476 In the late 1960s, Congress
recognized that flood insurance was extremely difficult for homeown-
ers to obtain.477 Large, correlated losses made it uneconomical for the
private insurance market to offer insurance or offer insurance at rea-
sonable rates.478 Consumers were unwilling to pay large enough pre-
miums to support the market479 due to lack of education and the
seeming remoteness of the risk. The Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) administers NFIP and controls policy terms.480 In
short, private insurers write NFIP policies, but the government pays
losses under them.481 Like cyber insurance, it is gap-filling insurance
and is considered key-event insurance.482
The NFIP model is attractive in the context of cyber risk manage-
ment for several reasons. First, it was developed to provide gap insur-
ance in response to correlated failure great enough to render policy
premiums prohibitive. This formulation has parallels with cyber in-
surance. NFIP was further developed with prevention in mind and
models how an insurance program can bring uniformity across state
and local regulation. It shows the possibility of educating on complex
issues, such as floodplains and floodplain management. The policy is
based on cost-benefit analysis with the cost of prevention being less
than the cost of disaster relief. In the cyber ecosystem, this model
demonstrates a method to deal with correlated failure and security
interdependency. For example, if a Windows vulnerability was ex-
ploited across many systems, flood insurance could provide a model to
address that loss. It could benefit all constituents with all threat
levels, providing businesses and even consumers with reasonably
priced insurance while handling large-scale damage and loss from
APTs.
Corresponding regulation to qualify for insurance may improve se-
curity. NFIP is included here because it is the only model that sug-
gests methods to regulate the powerful and elusive software and
technology companies. For example, software and technology develop-
476. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. FEMA, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1155 (W.D. Wash. 2004).
477. Id. at 1156.
478. See 42 U.S.C. § 4001 (Supp. 2016).
479. LaRosa & Campbell, supra note 321, at 62.
480. Gowland v. Aetna, 143 F.3d 951, 953 (5th Cir. 1998).
481. LaRosa & Campbell, supra note 321, at 62.
482. Id. at 60, 62.
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ment would be regulated by insistence of the insurance program on
certain cybersecurity standards before allowing businesses to insure
at the government rate, like banks requiring flood insurance to mort-
gage properties. Businesses could pass these costs to the technology
sector by demanding and creating a market for secure products. It is a
model that is forward looking with insurance as part of a larger
scheme to address security and reduce losses by controlling develop-
ment, not just reacting to the ever-morphing cyber threat. Insurance
has tackled correlated and monumental losses before, but cyber insur-
ance must be unusually proactive due to the changing nature of the
risk. The NFIP demonstrates how insurance efforts could control de-
velopment over decades to reduce losses in the long term.
These models are provided to begin discussion of different ap-
proaches to different cybersecurity problems. A comprehensive pro-
gram taking pieces from each should be considered. At this level of
analysis, it is productive to discuss benefits and problems with na-
tional insurance at a broad, general level.
D. General Benefits of National Cyber Insurance
The involvement of the U.S. government in cyber insurance would
be beneficial to education. Constituents in the ecosystem need knowl-
edge to act, and this need ranges from insurers to business to consum-
ers. The U.S. government has more information on cyber threats than
any other entity. Bringing government into insurance and providing
budgetary incentives to minimize loss has the potential to benefit
other constituencies and allow the currently limited national security
infrastructure a more productive role in preventing loss. Affordable
insurance that covers a broad base of losses would allow businesses
and the technology sector to share more freely with government, thus
improving the scope of that clearinghouse without fear of existential
liability exposure.
Affordability also would limit adverse selection and focus business
on prevention instead of purchasing insurance to avoid prevention.
Federal assets backing private insurers would allow insurers to con-
tinue with that unusually effective regulation instead of devolving in
litigation prevention and lobbying. Broader coverage would improve
the size of pool available to share risk and, like TRIA, a program could
be developed as a temporary measure if the market were able to take
over after the risk pool is sufficient.
Mandatory insurance (both generally and for federal contractors),
strict liability for data breaches, and more rigid requirements for in-
formation sharing have been suggested as remedial measures.483
483. Bonner, supra note 80, at 277 (federal contractor mandatory cyber insurance);
Hurwitz, supra note 66, at 1542–46 (strict liability encouraging insurance); John-
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Having affordable cyber insurance available that covers common
cyber events increases the potency of these programs. Strict liability is
arbitrary and may target business interests in favor of consumers
without providing negative incentives to software companies and the
technology sector. It further fails to recognize the national security el-
ements of the cyber ecosystem. A national cyber insurance program
with affordable, comprehensive coverage and potential federal back-
stop would alleviate the harm from arbitrarily deciding what constitu-
ents should suffer because of federal policy. Furthermore, proposed
liability regimes and insurance requirements are likely more viable
politically if combined with affordable insurance.
The amount—trillions of dollars—that the federal government has
proven it can insure would serve as the primary benefit of a federal
program.484 The chance of a self-sustaining risk pool with affordable
premiums and broad coverage would require levels of capitalization
that may exceed the level that the private market can provide.
E. Counterpoint: Possible Negative Results of National
Cyber Insurance
Effective cyber insurance and regulation would be extremely com-
plex and, therefore, very costly.485 A tradeoff between defense spend-
ing and recognition of the societal cost of cyber losses and the policies
that contributed to them would need to occur to make a program effec-
tive. The cost may be prohibitive, and federal insurance programs
have shown weakness in recouping government outlays.486 The com-
plexity of the regulation needed is further concerning. The FDIC
served as an important tool to address banking problems, but it de-
pended on the quality of the underlying regulation. The FDIC failed to
prevent the losses of 2007–2008 because the underlying law and regu-
lation had been gutted since the 1930s.487 It was critical, however, to
the response.488 Federal insurance has shown an ability to address
monumental risk, such as flood loss, but regulation in the cyber
ecosystem would need to be nimble and responsive to constant change
in technology and threats.489 This would test a lumbering
bureaucracy.
son, supra note 58, at 297–302 (information sharing); Trang, supra note 57, at
409–17 (mandatory insurance generally).
484. See Insurance Programs, supra note 442.
485. Eastman, supra note 2, at 532–33.
486. Gerrish, supra note 447, at 1833–40 (describing issues with recovering money
paid to insurers under TRIA).
487. See Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr., The Road to Repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, 17
WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP. L. 441, 541–48 (2017).
488. See DIV. INS. & RESEARCH, FDIC, CRISIS AND RESPONSE: AN FDIC HISTORY,
2008–2013 (2017).
489. Eastman, supra note 2, at 532–33; Johnson, supra note 58, at 277–78.
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Another federal insurance backstop program, TRIP, arguably
stunted the development of a private terrorism insurance market.490
By nationalizing insurance away from state regulation and creating
uniform policy standards, TRIP minimized transaction costs to the
point that state-regulated private insurers could not compete and the
private market failed to develop. The temporary program thus has
been extended and private insurers continue to exclude terrorism cov-
erage.491 The very efficiency of nationalizing insurance and removing
policy variation crushed the private market. Cyber insurance is in its
infancy now like terrorism insurance was after 9/11. Adoption of a suc-
cessful national cyber insurance policy would likely threaten the suc-
cess of an adequate private market developing. A private market has
the potential to be more reflexive and a better regulator in an ecosys-
tem of rapid change than a government program.
The final and most important risk associated with a national in-
surance program is overall efficacy in addressing the risk. NFIP ar-
guably has failed in this measure. FEMA has oversight of local
governments with respect to floodplain development and risk mitiga-
tion, but critics argue it cannot compel enforcement well enough to
address the risk.492 The goal of NFIP to expend money on prevention
to save in disaster relief expenditures arguably has failed, too.493 Pri-
vate insurance, with its current small market and limited adoption, is
able to effectively regulate, but transitioning this model to a compre-
hensive national program obviously is not guaranteed.
VII. CONCLUSION
U.S. policy led to fantastic developments in telecommunications
and the Internet. The very qualities that made these developments
successful made them insecure. National security institutions, other
public law institutions, and private law cannot provide security. In-
surance has potential and has shown to be uniquely adept in regulat-
ing for cybersecurity. The private cyber insurance market, however, is
too small compared to the risks, and the insurance lacks in coverage,
is not widespread, is expensive, is difficult to model, and is hard to
obtain. As small businesses become the target of choice for hackers, a
national cyber insurance program has promise for improving public
and private collaboration, improving risk pooling, providing affordable
premiums, protecting private insurers from “Cybergeddon” losses, and
improving regulation. Government intervention into a private market
490. Gerrish, supra note 447, at 1833–48.
491. Id. at 1829–30, 1848–49.
492. Christine M. McMillan, Comment, Federal Flood Insurance Policy: Making Mat-
ters Worse, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 471, 501–02 (2007).
493. Oliver A. Houck, Rising Water: The National Flood Insurance Program and Loui-
siana, 60 TUL. L. REV. 61, 128–33 (1985).
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is not to be taken lightly, but because of the overwhelming risk and
failure of existing institutions, a national cyber insurance program
merits further discussion.
